an entirely different defendant on the basis of a state-law claim over which there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction, simply because his claim against the first defendant and his claim against the second defendant 'derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.'" Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 14 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725). In order to decide the propriety of the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction the Aldinger court employed a three-step analysis. The "three-step" or "three-tiered" analysis enunciated in Aldinger has never been changed by the Supreme Court and is the approach to pendent party jurisdiction which binds this court. International Molders v. United Foundries, 644 F. Supp. 499, 503 (M.D. Pa. 1986). In determining whether pendent party jurisdiction is an appropriate exercise of federal judicial power, the court must first consider whether there is constitutional power to entertain the state law claim; secondly, whether the Congressional statute conferring jurisdiction over the federal claim expressly or by implication negates the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular federal claim; and finally if considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants compels a discretionary exercise of jurisdiction. International Molders, 644 F. Supp. at 504; Hatcher v. Emergency Medical Specialty Services, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (D.N.J. 1986); Grodjeski v. Township of Plainsboro, 577 F. Supp. 67, 69 (D.N.J. 1983). In applying these principles, the Aldinger court found that "resolution of a claim of pendent party jurisdiction . . . calls for careful attention to the relevant statutory language." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17. Indeed, "before it can be concluded that such jurisdiction exists, a federal court must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. The court may not exercise its discretion until it has first determined that both the Constitution and the Congress permit the use of pendent party jurisdiction in that instance. Employing this approach in the case before it, the Supreme Court in Aldinger then rejected the application of pendent party jurisdiction when it is asserted against a municipal corporation in an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. The Court found that "a fair reading of the language used in § 1343, together with the scope of § 1983, required a holding that the joinder of a municipal corporation, like the county here, for purposes of asserting a state-law claim not within federal diversity jurisdiction, is without the statutory jurisdiction of the district court." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17.
Later courts have defined the parameters of Aldinger's holding. At first, the Aldinger Court writes that "this case presents the 'subtle and complex question with far-reaching implications', . . . whether the doctrine of pendent Jurisdiction extends to confer jurisdiction over a party as to whom no basis of federal jurisdiction exists." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 2-3. Later in the opinion the Court retreats from any far-reaching pronouncement about the availability of pendent party jurisdiction, stating that "we think it quite unnecessary to formulate any general all-encompassing jurisdictional rule." Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13. While at least one circuit court has interpreted Aldinger as barring pendent party jurisdiction in all cases, see Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977), other courts have not taken so drastic an approach.
In Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court's opinion in Aldinger cast "grave doubts" as to whether the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction could be extended to situations in which there was no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction over a party. Glus, 562 F.2d at 886-87. The court then went on to say that it recognized that Aldinger involved pendent jurisdiction and "could be construed as being limited to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) contexts." Glus, 562 F.2d at 887. See also Cheltenham Supply Corp. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1103, 1106-07 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (citing cases). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has applied a narrow interpretation of pendent party jurisdiction. Sansom Committee by Cook, 735 F.2d at 1551 (Garth, J. dissenting); International Molders 644 F. Supp. at 503-04.
Other courts have directly addressed the issue of the unavailability of pendent party jurisdiction in section 1983 suits. See Moore v. The Marketplace Restaurant, 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Otero, 598 F.2d 627 (1st Cir. 1979); Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Association, 585 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978); Grimes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1977). These courts have held that in section 1983 cases, the Supreme Court's holding in Aldinger makes the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction inappropriate. Moore, 754 F.2d at 1353; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 598 F.2d at 631; Finch, 585 F.2d at 780; Grimes, 565 F.2d 844. But see Moore, 754 F.2d at 1359-61 (Posner, J. concurring) (In his concurrence Judge Posner concludes that Aldinger's reasoning applies only to plaintiffs who seek to employ pendent party jurisdiction in the context of section 1983 suits so as to be able to sue municipalities, not suable under section 1983 at the time of the Aldinger decision. Judge Posner reasons that behind Aldinger lies a particular policy of immunizing municipal entities from liability; a policy not applicable to private parties. Judge Posner concludes, therefore, that Aldinger is not applicable to an attempt by a plaintiff to sue a private individual as a pendent party in conjunction with a section 1983 suit).
Lower courts have also confronted the issue of the availability of pendent party jurisdiction in section 1983 suits. In Grodjeski the court stated that "just as pendent party jurisdiction was not extended to an entity other than a 'party' in Aldinger, Congress has limited the scope of § 1983 actions taken under color of state law. Thus, it would appear that Congress did not intend that parties not acting under color of state law be sued in federal court for their private actions." Grodjeski, 577 F. Supp. at 71. Indeed, the most recent case in this district has held similarly. See Gorni v. Township of Springfield, No. 84-3365, slip op. (E.D.Pa. May 16, 1986) (Scirica, J.) (available on Lexis). In addition, numerous district courts in both this district and others have, in the years since Aldinger, held pendent party jurisdiction over private individuals to be unavailable in section 1983 suits. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Esquivel, 614 F. Supp. 986, 994 (D.N.M. 1985); Sturts v. City of Philadelphia, 529 F. Supp. 434, 439 (E.D.Pa. 1982); Watkins v. Roche, 529 F. Supp. 327, 332-33 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Morse Electro Products Corp v. S.S. Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474, 485 (D.N.J. 1977); Hupart v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, 420 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see Montgomery v. City of Chicago, 670 F. Supp. 230, 232-34 (N.D.Ill. 1987).
This case presents a factual situation identical to that faced by these courts. Here, as in the cases cited immediately above, plaintiffs with section 1983 claims against various state actors, seek to have the court exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs' purely state-law claims against different parties who are merely private individuals or entities. I will follow the clearly established trend of case law in this circuit and in others. "Under § 1983, Congress intended the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction only when the defendants have acted under color of law . . . . The inference is clear: Congress intended to negate the exercise of jurisdiction over all parties who have not acted under color of law." Stephenson, 614 F. Supp. at 994.
The Supreme Court's ruling requires that the court construe this jurisdictional statute strictly. Owen, 437 U.S. at 376; Grodjeski, 577 F. Supp. at 72. This court is without subject matter jurisdiction to ajudicate plaintiffs' state-law claims against these defendants.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be entered on behalf of moving defendants Dolly Wideman, Domestic Abuse Project, Brock, Allied, Scotfoam, Inc., General Felt Industries, Inc., Suzanne Noble and Delaware Legal Assistance.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 19th day of April, 1988, for the reasons set forth in my Memorandum, filed this date, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs' complaint against Dolly Wideman, Delaware County Abuse Project, Inc., Brock International Security Corp., Allied Security, Inc., Scotfoam, Inc., General Felt Industries, Inc., Suzanne Noble and Delaware County Legal Assistance Association, Inc. is DISMISSED, as are all cross-claims against these defendants.