presented on videotape. Ms. Corbett was shown to be present on the parking lot in front of plaintiff's clinic at certain times voicing her objections to plaintiff's provided services. She was shown participating in the "blockading" of an entrance onto plaintiff's property, and standing in front of a clinic physician's car.
In cases proceeding under Section 1962(d), "the key element is proof that the various crimes were performed in order to assist the enterprises' involvement in corrupt endeavors." United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 224, quoting Blakely and Goldstock, ' On the Waterfront': RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 341, 360-62 (1980) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that no evidence was presented that would suggest that Ms. Corbett committed any extortionate acts -- the predicate offense the jury found the enterprise committed. Even if it could be said that defendant Corbett acted along with members of the enterprise at certain times, there was no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that she acted in furtherance of its extortionate goals rather that its organized protests.
Furthermore, no evidence was adduced at trial from which the jury could have even inferred that an implicit or actual agreement existed between Corbett and members of the enterprise whereby Corbett would conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprises' activities. The most that could be inferred from the record is that Corbett may have agreed to participate in the constitutionally protected protest activities sponsored by members of the "enterprise", but not the extortionate goals of the enterprise. Therefore, this court will grant the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of defendant Corbett.
V. TRESPASS CLAIM
In their answers to Special Interrogatories, Section II, the jury found that twenty-four defendants intentionally entered land in the possession of the plaintiff without privilege to do so, or directed another to so enter the property. As a proximate result of the unauthorized entries, plaintiff suffered an injury to its business or property in the amount of $ 42,974.00. Since $ 887.00 of this amount had been awarded to plaintiff under the RICO claim, this amount was reduced to $ 42,087.95 to avoid a duplicative recovery.
Defendants Long and Baker seek a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that there was no evidence that they entered the plaintiff's property. To the extent that this court has found that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict as to these two defendants, defendants' motion is denied. See Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
Defendants contend that this court erred by permitting the jury to award plaintiff damages for injury to its business as well as injury to its property under the trespass claim. Twelve defendants state that August 10, 1985 is the only date that damage to either personal or real property of the plaintiff occurred.
Since there was no evidence that these defendants trespassed on that date, they should be assessed only nominal damages. Ten defendants admit that evidence was presented as to their presence in plaintiff's property on August 10, 1985, but submit that they should only have to pay for the actual damage to plaintiff's real property, not for any injury to plaintiff's business.
Defendants submit that the only applicable damage presented was the damage to plaintiff's equipment which, defendants aver, is represented by the $ 887.00 figure. The balance of the award represents the cost of security guards which plaintiff hired to keep defendants from trespassing. See Testimony of Ardis Ryder, N.T. 10-3.
Applying Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
The authorities are clear to the effect that where the complaint is for trespass to land the trespasser becomes liable not only for personal injuries resulting directly and proximately from the trespass but also for those which are indirect and consequential.
Kopka v. Bell Telephone Co. of PA., 371 Pa. 444, 451, 91 A.2d 232 (1952). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court pronouncement follows the general rule in regards to tortfeasors in general; that the trespasser is responsible in damages for all injurious consequences flowing from his trespass which are the natural and proximate result of his conduct. See 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass, Section 52. This court sees no valid reason why a trespasser could not be held liable for injuries to his or her business which are properly found by a jury to be the proximate cause of the trespass. If plaintiff's alleged injuries to business were not the consequence of defendants actions, the jury would have found that they were not the proximate cause of defendants' actions. Plaintiff's injuries as alleged and proven were not unduly indirect or remote from defendants' trespass. Therefore, defendants' motion on this ground is denied.
An order follows.
AND NOW, this 31st day of March, 1988, upon consideration of defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, for a new trial, and the responses thereto, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing Memorandum, it is ORDERED that:
1. The motion of defendant Linda Corbett for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of defendant Linda Corbett and against plaintiff Northeast Women's Center, Inc.
2. The motion of all other named defendants for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial is DENIED.