(1945). That case held that due process is satisfied when a nonresident defendant has such minimum contacts with the forum state "that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. at 316.
The "minimum contacts" test does not allow for mechanical application. Also, since International Shoe involved the issue of under what circumstances a state could assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation and since many of the subsequent cases dealt with a commercial setting, it is somewhat difficult to apply the reasoning of many cases considering the "minimum contacts" test to this case. Nevertheless, the "minimum contacts" test is the test to be applied here. In deciding this, the facts must be weighed to see whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present. Few answers "will be written in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable." Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978).
Important factors in determining whether this test has been met are the quality of the contacts between the defendant and the forum state, see McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223, 78 S. Ct. 199 (1957), whether the cause of action flows from the contact or contacts, and whether the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958). The test for the foreseeability of a tort is whether "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
A special situation occurs where there is an intentional tort in one state calculated to cause harm in the forum state. Where such intentional conduct is involved, "Jurisdiction over [defendant] is therefore proper in [the forum state] based on the 'effects' of [his] conduct in [another state]." Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
Under these tests, it is clear that plaintiffs' claims against defendant Hestor arose out of forum related activities. Defendant Hestor was an employee of plaintiff National Mortgage, and his paychecks came from the Philadelphia office. Documents were from time to time sent to Philadelphia for discussion or approval. Mortgage loans with documentation fraudulently altered by defendant Hestor were known by him to be destined for purchase or resale in Pennsylvania. By entering into an employment relationship with plaintiffs, particularly a relationship of trust, defendant Hestor purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. It was clearly foreseeable to defendant Hestor that any fraudulent alterations of mortgage loan documents would have effects within Pennsylvania. It is also clear that, if as alleged, defendant Hestor acted fraudulently against the interests of his employer and in the hope of advancing his own wellbeing, he was acting in his own behalf and not on behalf of the corporation. Therefore, I gather from the allegations of the complaint and accept for purpose of argument that defendant Hestor intentionally availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in Pennsylvania, and committed a tort intended to have effect in Pennsylvania. This is sufficient to bring him within the reach of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, and comports with due process.
While MOTION OF DEFENDANT GARY HESTOR FOR DISMISSAL (filed October 30, 1987) does not ask for change of venue as an alternative to dismissal, in REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF DEFENDANT GARY HESTOR IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DISMISSAL (filed December 4, 1987), defendant suggests a transfer to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia as an alternative to dismissal. Since I am not granting dismissal, I will treat that suggestion as an amendment to defendant's motion. A district court may transfer a civil action to another district in which it might have been brought if the transfer is "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The moving party bears the burden of justifying the transfer. The court has broad discretion in deciding whether transfer is warranted. See Plum Tree v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 756 (3d Cir. 1973).
A motion to transfer is determined by the same factors relevant to a determination of a forum non conveniens motion, but the discretion given to the district judge is broader in deciding a change of venue. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 99 L. Ed. 789, 75 S. Ct. 544 (1955). The court must consider both the public interest and the private interests of the parties. The factors to be considered are:
1. plaintiff's choice of forum;