filed: March 14, 1988.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSEPH GRAHAM, APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Criminal Division, No. 1734/85, DIEFENDERFER, J.
Edward R. Eidelman, Public Defender, Allentown, for appellant.
William H. Platt, District Attorney, Allentown, for Com., appellee.
Olszewski, Kelly and Montgomery, JJ. Montgomery, J., concurs in the result.
[ 372 Pa. Super. Page 366]
Appellant, Joseph Graham, appeals from judgment of sentence imposed upon his convictions of terroristic threats and recklessly endangering another person. We deny allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of sentence.
On May 2, 1986, the appellant was found guilty of terroristic threats (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706) and of recklessly endangering
[ 372 Pa. Super. Page 367]
another person (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705) following a jury trial. No post-trial motions were filed. Sentencing was scheduled for June 16, 1986. On that date, the public defender representing appellant sought a continuance on the grounds that he feared that the pre-sentence report prepared by the Lehigh County Probation Office was prejudicial to appellant because appellant had once threatened one of its officers with a firearm. The public defender requested that instead of using the Lehigh County Probation Office's report, a new report be drawn up by the state probation office. The trial judge granted a continuance but did not order that a second report be submitted to the court. On August 26, 1986, a second sentencing hearing was conducted following which appellant was sentenced to a term of two (2) to five (5) years imprisonment in a state correctional facility. Thereafter, appellant filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence which was denied by the trial court. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises two contentions on appeal: (1) the trial judge failed to properly articulate on the record sufficient reasons for the sentence imposed; and (2) the trial judge abused its discretion by improperly relying on a prejudicial pre-sentence investigation report, when an impartial source was available. Both contentions involve challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence.*fn1
[ 372 Pa. Super. Page 368]
Appellant has made no attempt to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) as required by Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). See Commonwealth v. Darden, 366 Pa. Super. 597, 600-605, 531 A.2d 1144, 1146-48. Though this Court has the authority to direct counsel to supplement the brief to cure the defect (see Commonwealth v. Zeitlen, 366 Pa. Super. 78, 530 A.2d 900 (1987)), we decline to do so in the instant case. Review of the record and appellant's brief reveals the complete absence of a substantial question as to the adequacy of the statement of reasons for the sentence imposed*fn2 or as to the appropriateness of sentence imposed considering the Sentencing Code as a whole (see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9781(b), 9781(c)).*fn3 We see no reason to delay disposition of this appeal to compel submission of a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement which inevitably
[ 372 Pa. Super. Page 369]
would be found to fail to raise the appearance of a substantial question as to the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. We note that the emphasis in Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, supra, is on precise compliance with the procedural rules before granting allowance of appeal; the same precision would not appear to be necessary to a disposition denying allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Pickford, 370 Pa. Super. 444, 459, 536 A.2d 1348, 1356 (1987) (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting); Commonwealth v. Zeitlen, supra, 366 Pa. Superior Ct. at 87, 530 A.2d at 905 (Kelly, J., joining and concurring).
Based upon the foregoing, allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of sentence is denied.