that the provision violates the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Defendants have not attacked plaintiffs' standing to assert this claim. It would seem that, like the claims discussed above, it is equally vulnerable to such an attack. Neither plaintiff has established that he has the facilities, or has concrete plans to obtain the facilities, necessary to the operation of the retail sale of wine directly to the public. It may be that the argument was not made because the contingencies are fewer in this situation. Unlike the exemptions for limited wineries and historic distilleries, a sacramental wine licensee can purchase its wine from others and need not obtain production facilities. Hence, the hurdles to successfully opening one of these businesses are substantially less than obtaining or building a winery, or finding an historic distillery. Thus, the standing question in this case is closer to National Dental Council and Gavett.3
Nevertheless, we decline to adjudicate plaintiffs' establishment clause claim at this time. "The remedy of a declaratory judgment is discretionary even where a justiciable controversy exists." Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1170 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (brackets added). Also, a court is not compelled to grant either declaratory or injunctive relief simply because a plaintiff has established standing. See National Dental Council, supra. Both forms of relief, being discretionary, can be withheld unless: (1) the issues are fit for judicial resolution and (2) withholding judicial consideration would result in hardship to the parties. See Wilmac Corp. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1987); A. O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976).
Withholding judicial consideration will not result in hardship to the plaintiffs on the present record since their plans are too uncertain and speculative at this time. In short, their first amendment claim is not ripe and we decline to adjudicate it.
We will issue an appropriate order.
AND NOW, this 22nd day of December, 1987, it is ordered that:
1. Plaintiffs' complaint insofar as it attacks provisions of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code dealing with limited wineries and historic distilleries is dismissed for lack of standing.