Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil at No. 93 October Term, 1985.
John Shniper, Spring City, for appellant.
Louis E. Bricklin, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Montemuro, Popovich and Cercone, JJ.
[ 368 Pa. Super. Page 400]
Appellant Louise Borysowski appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, appellee herein.
[ 368 Pa. Super. Page 401]
The sequence of events leading up to the present appeal occurred in the following manner. On November 13, 1977 appellant sustained injuries resulting from an automobile accident. Appellant filed a timely claim for no-fault benefits against appellee, her automobile insurance carrier, under the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (hereinafter "No-fault Act").*fn1 Appellee began paying no-fault benefits to appellant but ceased making payments on January 10, 1983. Thereafter, on October 7, 1985 appellant instituted an action seeking additional no-fault benefits from appellee. By way of new matter appellee asserted that appellant's claim was time barred by the two year statute of limitations contained in the No-fault Act. 40 P.S. § 1009.106(c)(1). The trial court granted appellee's subsequent motion for summary judgment, holding that appellant's claim was barred since it was not filed within two years from the date of the last payment of benefits, as required by Section 106(c)(1) of the No-fault Act. This timely appeal followed. We affirm.
The problem presented in this appeal results from the fact that between the time of appellee's last payment of benefits to appellant on January 10, 1983 and the commencement of appellant's action on October 7, 1985, the No-fault Act was repealed and replaced with the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (hereinafter "Financial Responsibility Law").*fn2 Appellant contends that the repeal of the No-fault Act on October 1, 1984, prior to the filing of his cause of action on October 7, 1985, makes the general six year statute of limitations governing contractual obligations applicable to his case, rather than the two year statute of limitations contained in the No-fault Act.*fn3
[ 368 Pa. Super. Page 402]
Initially we recognize that our scope of review of the entry of summary judgment is limited to a determination of whether the trial court has committed an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion. Peters Township School Authority v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty, 78 Pa. Commw. Ct. 365, 370, 467 A.2d 904, 906 (1983). In determining the propriety of the granting of a motion for summary judgment we must:
[a]ccept as true all well pleaded facts in the non-moving party's pleadings, giving the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. To uphold summary judgment, there must be not only an absence of genuine ...