Appeal from the Order of the Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program in the case of Susan W. Harman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Housing Finance Agency, Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program, No. Fact 48, dated February 14, 1984.
Raymond Radakovish, for petitioner.
Lawana M. Johns, for respondent.
Judges Craig and Doyle, and Senior Judge Blatt, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Blatt.
[ 108 Pa. Commw. Page 287]
Susan W. Harman (petitioner) petitions for review of a Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency (Agency) hearing examiner's order, which rejected her application for assistance under the Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program.
On May 14, 1985 the petitioner submitted an application to the Agency for mortgage assistance,*fn1 and she was notified by letter on September 17, 1985 that her application had been denied because there was "[n]o reasonable prospect of Mortgagor resuming full mortgage payments within 36 months and paying mortgage by maturity." The petitioner appealed, and, after a hearing, the hearing examiner issued an order on February 14, 1985 which affirmed the original agency determination.
Preliminarily we note that our scope of review is limited to determining whether or not constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law has been committed, or a necessary factual finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 99 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 77, 512 A.2d 1319 (1986).
The petitioner initially contends that Article IV-C of the Housing Finance Agency Law (Act), entitled
[ 108 Pa. Commw. Page 288]
Homeowners' Emergency Assistance (Article IV-C)*fn2 is unconstitutional. She alleges that the statute lacks the specificity required in order for the legislature to make an adequate delegation of power to the Agency, and that Section 404-C of Article IV-C, 35 P.S. § 1680.404c, is internally inconsistent, thereby rendering any action taken pursuant to that section arbitrary and capricious.
Our Supreme Court has held, however, that:
While the legislature cannot delegate power to make a law, it may, where necessary, confer authority and discretion in connection with the execution of the law; it may establish primary standards and impose upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy in accordance with the general provisions of the act.
Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of City of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 342, 54 A.2d 277, 284 (1947). Accordingly, not all of the administrative details must be specifically enumerated in the statute. Gilligan v. Pennsylvania ...