have not brought to our attention, and our research has not disclosed, any case to the contrary. See Lampliter, 792 F.2d at 1041 (no jurisdiction has found exclusion (h) to be ambiguous).
We find unconvincing defendants' argument that by modifying the policy to provide coverage for "bodily injury and property damage arising out of (a) the named insured's products," Complaint, Exhibit A, p. 8, the products hazard endorsement abrogates the liquor liability exclusion. The quoted language does not alter the corpus of the policy at all: in its "Definitions" section, the policy defines "products hazard" to include "bodily injury and property damage arising out of the named insured's products." Complaint, Exhibit A, p. 2. The endorsement merely eliminates the requirement that the injury occur away from the premises. This modification extends coverage to situations in which products, such as food and beverages, injure patrons before they leave the Club; it leaves undisturbed the scope of coverage for an intoxicated patron who leaves and causes injury to himself and others.
Most important, we see no conflict between the endorsement and exclusion (h). Using the canon of interpretation that specific language qualifies more general language in the same document, see Capitol Bus Co. v. Blue Bird Coach Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 556, 560 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Alloy Manufacturing Co. Employees Trust, 411 Pa. 492, 496, 192 A.2d 394 (1963); cf. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 55 U.S.L.W. 4820, 4822, 96 L. Ed. 2d 385, 107 S. Ct. 2494 (1987) (statutory interpretation), a reasonably intelligent reader would construe the policy as a coherent and consistent whole, admitting of no ambiguity. In the policy, along with its endorsement, plaintiff agreed to indemnify the Club for a general category of liability: that arising from bodily injury or property damage, including injury or damage caused by the Club's products. From that category, however, plaintiff and the Club agreed to carve out exclusions for certain situations in which liability may arise. Liability arising from service of alcohol in violation of statute is one such situation. To read the policy in any other way would effectively negate not only the liquor liability exclusion before us, but any other exclusion that purported to exclude coverage for situations that otherwise would fall within the ambit of broad language in the coverage section of a policy, even if that exclusion appeared in the clearest language.
We note that in reaching our conclusion we do not rely on plaintiff's argument that since the products hazard endorsement covers only products liability for defective products, alcohol, so far as it is not defective, cannot give rise to products liability within the scope of the policy. While Dram Shop liability arises from the negligent service of alcohol in violation of a statutory duty, rather than from any defect in the product, see Klein v. Raysinger, supra ; Restatement Second of Torts, § 402A comments i, j (1977); the liability does arise in the context of the sale of a product. The average person might reasonably interpret "products hazard" to include service of alcoholic beverages. Cf. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 765 (3d Cir. 1985) (a diet book can be a defective product within the meaning of products liability law).
Our interpretation of the policy does not drain the endorsement of any effect. The endorsement still provides coverage for the rather substantial liability that could result from the service of contaminated food and drink. The policy as we interpret it is neither unreasonable nor unconscionable. See Standard Venetian Blind, 503 Pa. at 307, 469 A.2d at 567.
We find that exclusion (h) to the policy between plaintiff and the Club clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for liability arising from the service of alcohol in violation of a statute. For this reason, we grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
An appropriate order will follow.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 9th day of July, 1987, for the reasons stated in this court's memorandum opinion issued this day, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motions for summary judgment be, and the same hereby are, denied; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within eleven (11) days of this order, the parties submit to the court a proposed declaratory judgment; if the parties cannot agree on a proposal, each party shall submit a separate proposal within eleven (11) days of this order.