Appeal from the Order Entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, No. 4345 September Term 1982.
Perry J. Fiorayanti, Philadelphia, for appellant (at 899) and for appellee (at 1088).
Claire D. Newman, Philadelphia, for appellant (at 1088) and for appellee (at 899).
Cirillo, President Judge, and Rowley and Hoffman, JJ.
[ 363 Pa. Super. Page 14]
These are consolidated cross appeals from the trial court's Order simultaneously entering a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff Ronald Penn.
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on December 29, 1979. Formal application for benefits was submitted by him to his insurer, Nationwide, on April 23, 1980. Nationwide denied plaintiff's claims on May 25, 1982. Plaintiff then instituted this action under the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Act against Nationwide on September 30, 1982. The case was first heard in arbitration which resulted in an award to plaintiff. Defendant Nationwide appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. That court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on the issue of basic loss benefits. Post-trial motions were then filed by both parties but never disposed of by the trial court. Nationwide filed a timely appeal from the verdict in favor of plaintiff as well as from the denial of counsel fees. Plaintiff also filed a timely appeal from the denial of counsel fees.
Two issues are presented on these appeals: whether Murphy v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 528, 469 A.2d 1378 (1983) (holding that the insured must file his claim for benefits under the No-Fault Act within two years from the date the expenses were incurred) should be
[ 363 Pa. Super. Page 15]
applied retroactively, and whether the trial court erred in not awarding counsel fees.
Before reaching the merits of these appeals however, we must determine whether they are properly before us. Commonwealth v. Williams, 357 Pa. Super. 462, 516 A.2d 352 (1986). Though not raised by any party, questions of jurisdiction and appealability must be raised by the Court sua sponte. Id. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the case before us is fatally deficient substantively, procedurally and physically. We therefore dismiss both appeals.
This action was presented to the trial court either on a case-stated basis or upon a stipulation of facts. Generally, the distinction ...