Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, of Chester County, No. 85-04390.
James D. Jordan, Media, for appellant.
Eric S. Coates, Oxford, for appellee.
Cirillo, President Judge, and Rowley and Hoffman, JJ.
[ 362 Pa. Super. Page 405]
A default judgment was entered against appellant by a District Justice and appellant filed an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas by mailing the appropriate notice to the Prothonotary. The appeal was docketed; however, appellant
[ 362 Pa. Super. Page 406]
failed to file proof of service of the notice of appeal within 5 days as required by Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1005.B. Upon appellee's praecipe, and in accordance with Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1006, the trial court entered an order striking the appeal on July 12, 1985. Appellant filed a motion to strike the July 12 order and reinstate its appeal. On December 10, 1985 the trial court denied appellant's motion to reinstate the appeal. Appellant next filed a motion for post-trial relief which contained a petition to reconsider the order of December 10. No action was taken by the trial court until May 5, 1986, when the court denied appellant's petition to reconsider. This appeal is taken from the May 5 order.
As always, our first task on review is to determine whether an appeal is properly before us. See Sipowicz v. Sipowicz, 358 Pa. Super. 319, 517 A.2d 960 (1986) (reviewing court may address issues of appealability and jurisdiction sua sponte). We hold that the December 10, 1985 order, denying appellant's motion to reinstate its appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, was a final order for purposes of appeal to our Court and that appellant's failure to appeal within 30 days of the entry of the December 10 order requires to us to conclude that the present appeal must be quashed as untimely.
[A] final appealable order is one which ends the litigation or disposes of the entire case. Piltzer v. Independence Federal Savings and Loan Association of Philadelphia, 456 Pa. 402, 319 A.2d 677 (1974). An order will also be treated as final if the practical consequence is, in effect, to put an appellant out of court, or if it precludes an appellant from presenting the merits of the claim to the lower court. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394 A.2d 542 (1978)
Grossman v. Commissioner of Police, 318 Pa. Super. 584, 589, 465 A.2d 1007, 1010 (1983). See also Bracken v. Bracken, 294 Pa. Super. 371, 439 A.2d 1247 (1982); Rohr v. Keystone ...