Plaintiffs argue that this action is not time-barred because Mr. Owens did not see a copy of Dr. Friedman's report and did not learn of the diagnosis of asbestosis until March, 1982, after he was examined by another physician. Plaintiffs also argue that even if the statute of limitations began to run in July, 1981, their claims against the Charter defendants are not time-barred because they filed an action against the Cape defendants, the alleged alter-ego of the Charter defendants, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on April 12, 1982.
"The polestar of the Pennsylvania discovery rule is not a plaintiff's actual acquisition of knowledge but whether the knowledge was known, or through the exercise of diligence knowable to plaintiff." O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 1981). Plaintiff's failure to realize that he had a cause of action or that anyone has committed wrongful or legally culpable conduct does not prevent the statute of limitations from running. See, e.g., Lucera v. Johns-Manville Corp., 354 Pa. Super. 520, 533, 512 A.2d 661, 667 (1986). Clearly, Mr. Owens, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known that he had an asbestos-related injury no later than July 1, 1981.
Mr. Owens retained a lawyer because he believed that he had suffered lung injuries. That lawyer sent Mr. Owens to a physician who examined him and made a diagnosis that he had an asbestos-related condition. Mr. Owens's attorney then filed a worker's compensation claim on Mr. Owens's behalf. Even if Mr. Owens did not know the claim was filed or the basis for it, he had only to ask either the physician or the attorney what the examination revealed to learn the diagnosis. The failure to make such an inquiry is failure to exercise reasonable diligence as a matter of law. Mr. Owens's injuries were knowable through the exercise of reasonable diligence more than two years before this action was instituted; therefore, plaintiffs' claims are time-barred.
Even if plaintiffs had met their burden of proving that Mr. Owens personally did not know and through the exercise of due diligence could not have known of the injury caused by defendants until May, 1982, the claims asserted in this action would nonetheless be time-barred because Mr. Owens's agent, Attorney Finn, had sufficient knowledge of the accrual of the claims to start the statute of limitations running in July, 1981. A client "is considered to have 'notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.'" Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734, 82 S. Ct. 1386 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 25 L. Ed. 955 (1879)). The agent's knowledge "concerning a matter as to which he acts within his power to bind the principal or upon which it is his duty to give the principal information" affects the liability of the principal. Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 272 (1958). Attorney Finn was Mr. Owens's agent to obtain benefits for him because of Mr. Owens's pulmonary disability incurred in the course of his employment at the GAF plant. A medical diagnosis of asbestos-related injury was received by Mr. Owens's attorney in the course of that engagement in connection with the very matter which was the subject matter of the agency. The attorney acted within his power to bind his principal and had a duty to inform Mr. Owens of the diagnosis of an asbestos-related injury in July, 1981; Mr. Owens is deemed to have had notice of his asbestos-related injury at that time.
The statute of limitations began to run in July, 1981 when Attorney Finn and Mr. Owens had notice. This suit was not filed until January 9, 1984, more than two years after the statute began to run, so the claims asserted are time-barred. There is no merit to plaintiffs' argument that the filing of a suit against the Cape defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County tolled the statute of limitations in this action. What, if any, right the plaintiffs may have to reopen the state court action is a matter for that court to decide.
In their memorandum of law in support of the motion for summary judgment, defendants assert that Mrs. Owens's claims are wholly derivative of Mr. Owens's. Plaintiffs did not oppose that contention. Because the court has determined that Mr. Owens's original action is barred by the statute of limitations, Mrs. Owens's derivative claims are barred as well.
Because Mr. Owens should have known of the injuries alleged in this action through the exercise of due diligence and because his attorney knew of those injuries more than two years before the commencement of this action, summary judgment must be granted against the plaintiffs in favor of the Charter defendants and GAF.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 18th day of March, 1987, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing Memorandum, it is ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment of defendants Charter Consolidated P.L.C., Charter Consolidated Investments, Ltd., Central Mining Finance, Ltd., Consolidated Mines Selection Co., Ltd., and British South Africa Co., Ltd. (the "Charter defendants") and GAF Corporation are GRANTED.