Appeal from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the case of In Re: Claim of John Matusavage, Jr., No. B-238427.
John Matusavage, Jr., petitioner, for himself.
Charles D. Donahue, Assistant Counsel, with him, Clifford F. Blaze, Deputy Chief Counsel, for respondent.
Judges MacPhail, Doyle and Barry, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Doyle.
[ 104 Pa. Commw. Page 38]
John Matusavage Jr. (Claimant) petitions for review of an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming the referee's determination that Claimant was financially ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits due to Claimant's failure to meet certain requirements pertaining to base year wages under Section 401(a) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Act), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 801(a).*fn1 We affirm.
Claimant was last employed as a police officer by the United States Federal Protective Service (Employer) from June 6, 1977 through January 28, 1982. Claimant filed an application for benefits effective November 25, 1984, thereby establishing as a base year the period from July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984. After Claimant's separation from employment, Employer issued Claimant a check for $667.91 on March 14, 1984, which the referee found represented an amount due Claimant for work performed prior to his separation on January 28, 1982.
[ 104 Pa. Commw. Page 39]
Following a hearing attended by both Claimant and a representative of the Employer, the referee found Claimant to be financially ineligible to receive benefits pursuant to Section 401(a) of the Act. The Board affirmed the referee's decision, and Claimant petitions for review to this Court.*fn2 We affirm.
Claimant raises a number of issues. He argues first that the referee improperly relied on hearsay evidence in determining that Claimant was not employed by Employer after January 28, 1982 and that the check which Claimant received from Employer on March 14, 1984 was for services rendered prior to Claimant's separation date. Claimant argues to the contrary that Employer orally re-hired Claimant to audit his own payroll records, at various times during October, November, and December 1983, and that the check was issued as payment for the audit.
While the testimony of Employer's representative may have been hearsay, the referee's findings of fact are still supported by substantial evidence because Claimant's own testimony corroborated that of Employer's representative. The notes of testimony disclose numerous instances where Claimant acknowledges that his last day of employment was January 28, 1982 and that the check he received in 1984 was for work performed prior to January 28, 1982. While as a general proposition, hearsay evidence cannot be used by a referee as a basis for findings of fact, Bower v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 97 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 337, 509 A.2d 922 (1986), when the hearsay which
[ 104 Pa. Commw. Page 40]
is not objected to is corroborated by other competent evidence, it can support such findings.*fn3 Socash v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 516, 451 A.2d 1051 (1982). Here, Claimant's own testimony corroborated Employer's testimony that Claimant was last employed on January 28, 1982 and that the payment made to Claimant in 1984 was for services performed before January 28, 1982.*fn ...