Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas, Fayette County, Criminal Division, at No. 434 of 1982.
Alphonse P. LePore, Jr., Public Defender, Uniontown, for appellant.
Gerald R. Solomon, District Attorney, Uniontown, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Cirillo, President Judge, and Brosky and Montgomery, JJ.
[ 360 Pa. Super. Page 483]
This appeal from the judgment of sentence following appellant's conviction on charges of driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731),*fn1 failing to drive at a safe speed (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361) and possession of a prohibited offensive weapon (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908), is again before us on remand from the Supreme Court, Commonwealth v. Monosky, 511 Pa. 148, 511 A.2d 1346 (1986), which reversed our determination that a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 had occurred*fn2 and reinstated the judgment of sentence imposed by the trial court.
Pursuant to the mandate of our Supreme Court, the issues now remaining for our disposition are whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilt.*fn3
[ 360 Pa. Super. Page 484]
After examination of the record and consideration of the briefs of the parties, we affirm.
In evaluating a claim that the verdict is against the law for lack of sufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the verdict winner in this case, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom to determine if the Commonwealth has presented evidence sufficient to find each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Shirey, 343 Pa. Super. 189, 494 A.2d 420 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 336 Pa. Super. 120, 485 A.2d 459 (1984). Since the instant record does not reveal a verdict so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice, a new trial, therefore, is not mandated. Commonwealth v. Haight, 332 Pa. Super. 269, 481 A.2d 357 (1984).
With regard to appellant's conviction for failure to drive at a safe speed, the trial record discloses that appellant was initially observed by the two testifying patrol officers driving in excess of the posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour through a residential area on a foggy, wet day (N.T. 5, 28, 29, 34). Officer Capitos testified that it was necessary for him to accelerate to between 55 and 60 miles per hour in order to overtake appellant (N.T. 28). Both officers also expressed their opinion that appellant was traveling approximately 50 miles per hour when they initially observed him. (N.T. 29, 35).
First, we note that a police officer may properly stop a motor vehicle which he reasonably believes is traveling in excess of the legal ...