sources, the ledger will again show a positive balance. The teaching of Ginsburg and Conner is that the government has a right to that later income. In effect, the expenditures offset the subsequent income.
The ledger is the same whether the forfeiture order is entered before or after the legitimate income appears. It is the same whether the debit entries represent expenditures for wine, women, and song, or transfers made to friends and family in order to avoid seizure by the government. The purpose of the statute "was to remove the profit from organized crime by separating the racketeer from his dishonest gains." Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983). To permit the defendant to evade forfeiture by delaying discovery and transferring assets "would simply provide an incentive for racketeers to engage in complicated financial transactions to hide their spoils." Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d at 970.
The criminal court held that it had no authority to enter a criminal money judgment against the defendant, but declared that the government had a right to $1,640,000 in proceeds of the criminal activity. That right vested at the time of the criminal activity. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d at 801; S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 200, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 3376. That right would be meaningless unless the government, like any other entity with a legal right to funds, may invoke the equitable powers of the civil court for enforcement.
Therefore, the civil court may enter a money judgment against the defendant.
II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
The government alleges that David Rosenfield has transferred property to his family and friends in order to avoid forfeiture, and that these were fraudulent conveyances. The government seeks to set aside these transfers.
If the government is able to establish that the conveyances were fraudulent under Pennsylvania law, they will be set aside. However, there are substantial questions of material fact relating to these transactions. Therefore, the matter is not one in which summary judgment is appropriate.
An appropriate order is attached.
Upon consideration of the motion of the United States for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs' response, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the government's response, the memoranda submitted by the parties, the comments of counsel at oral argument, and for the reasons stated in the attached memorandum, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED;
2. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Summary judgment is entered in favor of the United States and against defendant David Rosenfield in the amount of $1,640,000. This case shall proceed to trial on the issue of whether any of the alleged transfers to the remaining defendants should be set aside as fraudulent conveyances.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Daniel H. Huyett, 3rd Judge
Before HUYETT, J.
AND NOW, this 23rd day of December, 1986, in accordance with the order dated December 23, 1986,
IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be and the same is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant David Rosenfield in the amount of $1,640,000.00.