body corporate and politic constituting a public corporation and government instrumentality. . . ." [Emphasis added].
Additionally the Wynne Court also dealt with the question of whether the Commonwealth System of Higher Education is a state agency. Id. at 79-81. In Wynne, the court relying upon the case of Pa. Industries for the Blind & Handicapped v. Com. of Pa. State System of Higher Education, 87 Pa. Commw. 1, 485 A.2d 1233 (1985),
held that Pennsylvania Courts are likely to construe 24 P. S. §§ 20-2001 et seq. as providing that the State System of Higher Education is an entity of the state. Therefore, since the Wynne decision found that the trend of the Pennsylvania Courts, as indicated by Pennsylvania Industries, is to construe the Commonwealth System of Higher Education as a state agency, we hold that the Eleventh Amendment bars this action as against the defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education.
Next we must consider plaintiff's complaint as against defendant Rod C. Kelchner. Defendant Kelchner is sued in this action both individually and as President of Mansfield University. The defendants maintain that the plaintiff may not sue state officials under the Eleventh Amendment and cite the United States Supreme Court cases of Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) as support for this proposition.
In Graham the Court held that the bar of the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits a damages action against a state in federal court, "remains in effect when state officials are sued for damages in their official capacity." [Citations omitted]. Kentucky v. Graham, supra, U. S. at , 105 S. Ct. at 3107. The Court stated that the Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state officials because "a judgment against a public servant 'in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents . . . ." [Citation omitted]. Id. In response to the defendants' argument, plaintiff relies upon this Court's ruling in Swinsick v. Mansfield State College, et al., Civil No. 80-1156 (M. D. Pa. January 26, 1981), Slip op. at p. 2,
which held that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for prospective injunctive relief against the individual defendants in their official capacities requiring them to conform future conduct in the law, even though such an injunction may have some effect on the state treasury." [Citation omitted]. [Emphasis added]. However, in the Swinsick opinion the Court went on to state that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action against state officials in their official capacities seeking damages for past wrongs. Id. Slip op. at p. 3. [Emphasis added]. Also in Pennhurst State School, supra, 465 U. S. at , 104 S. Ct. at 909, our Supreme Court stated that "when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief." In the present case the plaintiff's complaint seeks an award of monetary damages as recompense for past wrongs from the defendant Kelchner in his official capacity and does not request an injunction as to Kelchner's future conduct as President of Mansfield.
Therefore, the plaintiff's claims seeking relief in the nature of damages from defendant Kelchner in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Now we are left to consider plaintiff's allegations against defendant Kelchner as an individual and his pendent state law claim for breach of contract. As stated, the plaintiff's complaint is brought against defendant Kelchner both as an individual and as President of Mansfield. However, plaintiff's allegations against defendant Kelchner only attack the defendant's actions as an official of Mansfield. The plaintiff does not once allege any wrongdoing on the part of Kelchner as an individual and in a nonofficial capacity. Since the complaint is void of any violations of plaintiff's rights by Kelchner as an individual, there is no genuine issue of material fact in this respect. Therefore, summary judgment shall be granted in favor of defendant Kelchner as an individual. See Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982).
Finally, the plaintiff's pendent state law claim for breach of contract will also be dismissed. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 228 (1966), the Supreme Court stated that pendent jurisdiction lies within a court's discretion and is not a matter of plaintiff's right. The Court also noted that "if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well." Id. Therefore in the case at bar, since we have ruled that the plaintiff's federal claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, we shall dismiss the state claim for breach of contract as well.
An appropriate order shall be issued granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment and entering judgment in their favor and against the plaintiff.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
NOW, this 30th day of October, 1986, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
 the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted;
 the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to the liability issues is denied as moot;
 judgment is entered in favor of all of the defendants and against the plaintiff; and
 the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.