who will adequately represent their substantially common interests. This is particularly true here where the plaintiffs are family members and business partners who may wish to balance these interests against the interest of pursuing every conceivable avenue of recovery.
In short, where plaintiffs' similar interests are being adequately represented, I will not compel them to forfeit their choice of counsel so that they are free to pursue potential claims which they have no interest or obligation to pursue. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel International Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1977) (joint representation of third and fourth party defendants allowed where stock of both parties was owned by family members, both parties had substantial identity of interests, and both parties denied liability and placed fault on fifth party defendant); Como, 607 F. Supp. at 342-43 (joint representation of plaintiffs in securities action allowed where defendants argued that one of plaintiffs, rather than defendants, made material misrepresentations to the other plaintiffs); Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858, 860-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (joint representation of parents and son allowed in securities action against broker, who had employed son, where broker filed third party claims against son, and all plaintiffs sought to prove that broker, and not the son, mismanaged the account).
Second, each of the plaintiffs has consented to joint representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation, and after obtaining the advice of independent counsel. Moreover, each of the non-party limited partners of HJS Oil Ltd., 1983 has consented to the joint representation after full disclosure. See Como, 607 F. Supp. at 342-43 (where plaintiffs have knowledge of possible conflict of interest and nevertheless affirm their desire for joint representation, the court should be reluctant to disqualify their chosen counsel); Kerry Coal Co. v. U.M.W.A., 470 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 637 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Altschul, 488 F. Supp. at 861 (advice of independent counsel not required).
AND NOW, this 8th day of September, 1986, it is hereby ordered that the motion of defendants to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney is denied.