raised, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating contacts with the forum state sufficient to give the court in personam jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiffs contend that they "should have the opportunity to further explore through discovery" the nature of defendant's contacts with this forum. See Document 17 of the Record at 5. The court agrees with plaintiffs.
Ordinarily, a court must determine whether plaintiffs seek to obtain general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction over defendant. The first, general jurisdiction, exists when the claim does not arise out of or is unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum. See Dollar Savings Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, 746 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1984). The second, specific jurisdiction, is invoked when the claim is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum. Id. The minimum contacts analysis is insufficient when the defendant's forum activities do not give rise to the claim. In invoking general jurisdiction, plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendant maintained "continuous and substantial forum affiliations." Id. See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984) (unless a defendant has "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with the forum state, the cause of action must arise from activities within the forum state). When the plaintiff's claim is not clearly frivolous, a district court should ordinarily allow discovery on jurisdiction in order to aid the plaintiff in discharging his burden of establishing in personam jurisdiction. Compagnie Des Bauxites DeGuinee v. L'Union Atlantique, S.A. D'Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1983). The scope of this discovery must be broad enough to allow plaintiff to pursue both the "minimum contacts" and "continuous and systematic contacts" theories until one or the other is ruled out. Id. at 363. Accordingly, defendant's motion will be denied so that plaintiffs may commence discovery in an attempt to establish personal jurisdiction over defendant.
Finally, defendant contends that the complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. "Generally, a complaint need not detail facts sufficient to state a cause of action; rather it must contain only a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment.'" Ruppert v. Lehigh County, 496 F. Supp. 954, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept as true all of the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint and the complaint must be construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff. See Banghart v. Sun Oil Co., 542 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Plaintiff's claim should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that it can prove no set of facts in support of its claims which would entitle plaintiff to relief. Id. In light of this standard, defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be denied.
Plaintiffs contend that defendant is individually liable pursuant to the WPCL. Plaintiffs seek to impose this liability, in part, because defendant was an agent or officer of United Foundries within the meaning of the WPCL. Document 1 of the Record at para. 30. See also New York Coat, Suit, Dress, Rainwear and Allied Workers' Union v. Sussex Sportswear, Inc., supra, at 1533 n.5 (complaint alleged defendant was an officer of corporation; sufficient to make defendant an employer under Pennsylvania law). While defendant maintains that he "never had responsibilities as either an officer or an agent with respect to any such obligations" concerning union pension obligations, see Document 7 at para. 8, it may be that further discovery will reveal enough facts favorable to plaintiff to sustain plaintiff's WPCL claim against defendant. See Musikiwamba v. Essi, Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985). Thus, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied.
Defendant relies on the Affidavit of Nathan A. Greenberg in support of its alternative request for summary judgment. Considering the present record, the court cannot find that there are no material facts in dispute and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is a "drastic remedy", see Reilly v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 764 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1985) and can only be entered "if appropriate." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The court may not resolve conflicting factual contentions on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975). In this case, certain material facts are at issue. Of course, should it later be determined that the proper factual predicate for maintaining a WPCL claim against defendant does not exist, defendant may renew his Motion for Summary Judgment or, as the case may be, may move for a directed verdict. Thus, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.
An appropriate Order will enter.
DATED: April 8, 1986
NOW, this 8th day of April, 1986, in accordance with the reasoning set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant Greenberg's Motion co Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment is denied.