the Mexican Embassy in Washington, rather than to the head of the Mexican ministry of foreign affairs or to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C. Legislative history makes clear that service by mail on an embassy is precluded under the Act. See H. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6623. See also 40 D 6262 Realty Corp. v. United Arab Emirates Government, 447 F. Supp. 710, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Second, the documents were not translated into the Spanish language, thus implicating Congress' concern about the difficulties of cross-lingual litigation.
In summary, the documents were sent to an arm of government that Congress has specifically rejected as an entity suited to processing information pertaining to lawsuits; the documents failed to contain the required notice of suit which would have provided information explaining the nature of this litigation and the right to remove; and that information which Mexico did receive was printed only in English. Denying the requested enlargement of time under these circumstances would certainly defeat Congress' intent in enacting the FSIA. Consequently, I conclude that Mexico has demonstrated sufficient cause to allow for this enlargement of time.
Mexico has moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Third Circuit has stated that under the FSIA, "Personal jurisdiction over the sovereign exists when the minimum contacts and requirements for service set forth in §§ 1605-08 are satisfied. To summarize this scheme, subject matter jurisdiction plus service equals personal jurisdiction . . . ." Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 415 U.S. 929, 102 S. Ct. 1297, 71 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1982). It is within the power of this court to examine the sufficiency of service in the state court, and upon a finding of insufficient service, to dismiss the case. See Gray, 443 F. Supp. at 821. See also Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437, 54 L. Ed. 272, 30 S. Ct. 125 (1910); Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964).
I have already concluded that service did not conform to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a), and was therefore insufficient. Consequently, the commonwealth court was without jurisdiction, and its final judgment is void. See Gray, 443 F. Supp. at 821-22. Accordingly, as matters now stand, the judgment against Mexico entered by the commonwealth court on April 17, 1984, must be vacated and the action dismissed.
This dismissal will be stayed 20 days from entry of the accompanying order, however, to allow plaintiff the opportunity to make proper service. If proof of proper service is not provided within this time period, the action will be dismissed. If proof of proper service is provided, the action will proceed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1448, 40 D 6262 Realty Corp., 447 F. Supp. at 712.
An order follows.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: PAGINATION IN THE HARD COPY SOURCE ENDS AT THIS POINT.]
AND NOW, this 7th day of January, 1986, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. Plaintiff's motion to remand is denied.
2. Mexico's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process is hereby granted. However, this order of dismissal is stayed 20 days to allow plaintiff to make proper service. If proof of proper service is filed with the Clerk within 20 days after entry of this order, the action will proceed.
3. The commonwealth court's order of April 17, 1984, as it pertains to Mexico, is hereby vacated.
4. In the event Lucchino makes timely and proper service, a pre-trial conference will be held on March 12, 1986, at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the status of discovery and the setting of a trial date.