the insurance companies or the agent should provide coverage for a fire loss he suffered. Id. The Supreme Court held that the case was improperly removed. In attempting to define the "separate and independent" requirement of subsection (c), the Court concluded that "where there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent cause of action . . . ." Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). The Finn court concluded that the allegations against the non-diverse defendant "involve[d] substantially the same facts and transactions as do the allegations against the [diverse defendants]," and that the damage stemmed from a "single incident." Id. at 16.
The Finn decision has had the effect of severely limiting the availability of removal under 1441(c). See Dorfman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 496 slip op. at 7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1985) (Broderick, J.); 14A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra § 3724, at 370; 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra P 0.163 [4.-5-1], at 340. Nonetheless, claims may be separate and independent where they involve "completely different questions of fact and substantially different questions of law," New England Concrete Pipe v. D/C Sys., 658 F.2d 867, 873 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing Climax Chem. Co. v. C.F. Braun Co., 370 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 981, 87 S. Ct. 1287, 18 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1967)), or where the defendants, acting individually, each invade a separate right of the plaintiff. Dorfman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 496, slip op. at 7-8 (quoting 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, supra P 0.163 [4.-5-1], at 323).
In this case, although the legal standards applicable to the unions may differ from those applicable to the other defendants, the claims against each defendant all depend on a full development of the facts at the time of the accident. Moreover, plaintiff's complaint, taken as a whole, alleges that the combination of action or inaction of each defendant contributed to plaintiff's injury. It follows, the claims must be viewed as "interlocking" within the meaning of the term used in Finn. While the nature of the duty each defendant allegedly owed to plaintiff may have differed qualitatively, the claims against the various defendants are dependent on each other. Cf. Bowerman v. Tomhave, 414 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (products liability claim against manufacturer of medical product not separate and independent from claim against physician for negligent insertion of product); Fischer v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 284 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (claim against union for breach of duty of fair representation not separate and distinct from claim against employer for breach of contract).
Furthermore, plaintiff has prayed for joint and several liability. While such a prayer is not controlling, Ryan v. Tollefson, 118 F. Supp. 420, 423 (E.D. N.Y. 1954), it provides a strong indication that there is only a single wrong. Armstrong v. Monex Int'l, 413 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Knight v. Chrysler Corp., 134 F. Supp. 598, 600 (D. N.J. 1955).
Finally, although subsection (c) should be applied fairly, the federal courts should construe and apply it in such a manner as will carry out the intent to restrict removal, White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp.716 (D. N.J. 1962), and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand. Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1957). Taking into account all of the foregoing, I must conclude that the claims against the union are not separate and independent from those against the other defendants.
A discussion of the unions' right to remove in this case would not be complete without mention of the First Circuit's decision in Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 346, 78 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1983). In Bonanno, defendants in a state proceeding petitioned to remove, claiming that although plaintiff had set forth a federal claim against only one defendant, the claims against the remainder of the defendants were pendent to the federal claim. Id. at 3-4. Each defendant joined in the petition for removal, id. at 3, and after a trial in the district court, a judgment was entered against the union and other parties on certain claims. Id. On appeal, the First Circuit held that although the district court had jurisdiction over the claims against the union, it did not have jurisdiction over the claims against the other defendants. Id. at 3-4. In reaching its result, the court rejected alternative arguments that either pendent party jurisdiction was appropriate in the case, id. at 6-8, or that the claims against the union were separate and independent. Id. at 8-11. Rather than remand the entire case to state court, however, the First Circuit relied on what it believed was the traditional practice that allowed a party against whom a federal claim had been asserted to remove the claim against it while leaving the other defending parties behind in state court. Id. at 11.
Without passing judgment on the soundness of the Bonanno bifurcation approach, I find that the instant case is distinguishable from Bonanno. The First Circuit expressly predicated the exercise of jurisdiction against the union on section 1441(b). As already discussed, subsection (b) requires the joinder in the petition of all co-defendants, a feature which was present in Bonanno, but absent in this case. Removal being a statutory right, procedures must be followed closely. Lewis v. Rego, 757 F.2d at 68; Resident Advisory Board v. Tate, 329 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Because these procedures have not been followed here, the Bonanno rationale is not controlling.
The summary judgment order entered August 14, 1985, in favor of American Tempering, Inc., M.L. Burke, and M.L. Burke Co. will be vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the matter will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
An order follows.
AND NOW, this day of December, 1985, the order dated August 14, 1985, granting summary judgment in favor of American Tempering, Inc., H. L. Burke, and M.L. Burke Co. is hereby vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.