Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in case of Rose Mary Jenkins v. Mr. and Mrs. McDonald, Constance Westerman Kelly, and Department of Police Administration, City/County of Philadelphia, No. 1655 October Term, 1983.
Salvatore De Lello, Jr., for appellant.
Ralph J. Luongo, Assistant City Solicitor, with him, Barbara W. Mather, City Solicitor, and Barbara R. Axelrod, Deputy City Solicitor, for appellees.
Judges Rogers, Barry and Palladino, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Palladino.
[ 92 Pa. Commw. Page 141]
Rose Mary Jenkins (Appellant) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) sustaining the preliminary objections of the City of Philadelphia (City) and dismissing Appellant's complaint against the City on the ground that the City was immune from liability under Section 8542 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Act), 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542. We affirm.
[ 92 Pa. Commw. Page 142]
On April 15, 1983, Appellant was injured when she was attacked by a stray dog as she walked her dog on a city sidewalk. As a result, Appellant filed suit against the City, alleging that her claim falls within two of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in the Act in that (1) the stray dog constituted a dangerous condition of the sidewalk, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(a)(7) and (2) the City is responsible for the care, custody and control of animals within its possession, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(a)(8).
When examining the decision of a trial court, this Court's scope of review is limited to a determination of whether constitutional rights have been violated or whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Board of Pensions and Retirement of the City of Philadelphia v. Einhorn, 77 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 228, 465 A.2d 139 (1983).
Appellant's first argument relies on 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b)(7), which provides in pertinent part an exception to immunity where there exists:
A dangerous condition of sidewalks within the rights-of-way of streets owned by the local agency, except that the claimant to recover must establish that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred and that the local agency had actual notice or could reasonably be charged with notice under the circumstances of the dangerous condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
In the case at bar, a stray dog is not a "reasonably foreseeable risk" of which the City "could reasonably be charged with notice." The language of the statute is clear. A stray dog cannot be reasonably considered ...