Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 21, 1984 in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Criminal Division, No. 88 CD 1983.
Anthony S. Federico, Jr., Harrisburg, for appellant.
Katherene E. Holtzinger-Conner, Deputy District Attorney, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Cavanaugh, Cercone and Lipez, JJ.
[ 345 Pa. Super. Page 197]
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County. Appellant was convicted, in a bench trial, of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. We reverse.
The testimony disclosed that on December 14, 1982, several members of the Pennsylvania State Police served a search warrant at 216 Beaver Road, Lower Paxton Township. The probable cause for the search was a controlled purchase of marijuana made from inside the residence within the past forty-eight hours; however, the seller was unidentified. The troopers gained admittance to the home and found two individuals present, the appellant and his sister-in-law, Theresa M. Smith. The appellant resided at that address with his brother and sister-in-law.
A total of 738.7 grams or 26.38 ounces of marijuana was found on the premises as a result of the search. A large portion of the marijuana seized was packaged into smaller containers. The bulk of the marijuana was apparently found in the bedroom of the owners of the residence, Ms. Smith and her husband. A small amount of marijuana as well as related paraphernalia were found in the kitchen. A small scale was found in a closet of a spare bedroom. No
[ 345 Pa. Super. Page 198]
controlled substance or related paraphernalia was found on the person of appellant.
The sole issue we will address in the instant appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view all reasonable inferences taken therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as a verdict winner. The test is whether the evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . The proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency ...