Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, of Allegheny County, No. CC8204460A.
Melinda G. Tell, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellant.
August J. Costanzo, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Rowley, Olszewski and Del Sole, JJ. Olszewski, J., files a dissenting opinion.
[ 348 Pa. Super. Page 347]
Appellee was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault*fn1 and obstructing administration of law or other governmental function.*fn2 The trial court arrested judgment on the aggravated assault conviction and the Commonwealth has appealed from that Order.
In alleging that the trial court erred, the Commonwealth presents two arguments. First, the Commonwealth argues that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim sustained serious bodily injury. Second, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred when it found that the Commonwealth failed to prove the element of specific intent because specific intent need not be proved when serious bodily injury has actually been inflicted.
Appellee has not presented a brief to this Court.
The trial court granted appellee's motion in arrest of judgment because "the actions of [appellee], under the circumstances, did not measure up to an attempt to cause serious bodily injury under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life." Trial court's opinion at 5-6 (emphasis in original). The trial court analogized appellee's act to an isolated shove, or the act of throwing someone to the ground and found that the connection between the officer's injuries and appellee's "acts is so attenuated that this court feels that the result was in no way within the intent or contemplation of [appellee]." Id. at 6.
In reviewing the trial court's order
[ 348 Pa. Super. Page 348]
we must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. Commonwealth Page 348} v. Meadows, 471 Pa. 201, 369 A.2d 1266 (1977). The standard used in our evaluation is '[w]hether accepting all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which, if believed the jury could properly have based its verdict; it would be nonetheless insufficient in law to find beyond a reasonable doubt ...