NO. 03570 PHILA. 1982, Appeal from th Order in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil No. 2437 October Term, 1971
Louis S. Criden, Philadelphia, for appellants.
William F. Livingston, Norristown, for appellee.
Spaeth, President Judge, and Brosky and McEwen, JJ.
[ 342 Pa. Super. Page 400]
This is an appeal from an order permitting appellee as a judgment lienor to foreclose against appellants' real estate, including appellants' residence. Appellants' principal argument is that their residence should be exempt from foreclosure because they claimed it as exempt in Federal bankruptcy proceedings. This argument is without merit, for when the judgment was initially entered, the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Act of November 6, 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), effective generally October 1, 1979, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.,*fn1 which contains the exemption on which appellants rely, had not been enacted. We therefore affirm.
On October 19, 1971, appellee filed a complaint in confession of judgment against appellants. The judgment, which was later revived, was secured by appellants' real estate, consisting of appellants' residence at 7145 Large Street, Philadelphia, and another property at 644 Durfor Street, Philadelphia.
In July 1979 the parties entered into a stipulation that, for an agreed upon time period, appellee would refrain from execution against the residence while appellants tried to obtain financing or sell the property, and that appellants would refrain from filing any proceedings to delay or avoid foreclosure of the residence. When appellants were unable
[ 342 Pa. Super. Page 401]
to finance or sell the property, an order was entered on November 28, 1979, directing the sheriff to sell appellants' residence.
On or about November 29, 1979, appellants jointly filed for bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petition listed appellee as a creditor and the residence as security for the debt. The residence was valued at approximately $30,000. Of this value, appellants claimed $15,000 as exempt. This claim was based on Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that a debtor may exempt from property of the estate either property that is exempt under State law or property that is exempt under Federal law.*fn2 Appellants claimed that their residence was exempt, up to $15,000, under Section 522(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.*fn3
As a consequence of the bankruptcy proceeding, proceedings against appellants' real ...