negligent property deprivation, plaintiff's due process rights have not been violated if the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy and the deprivation did not occur as the result of an established state procedure. Id. at 541. The plaintiff here is not claiming an unconstitutional state procedure, but a deviation from that procedure resulting in a violation of his rights.
The Supreme Court in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), extended the rule to include intentional deprivations of property. Some courts have reasoned that liberty interests also fall within the Parratt rule. In Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981), the plaintiff alleged that his football coaches at the State University engaged in acts under color of state law that deprived him of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit assumed, for purposes of its opinion, that the assault and battery alleged by the plaintiff deprived him of liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court focused on whether this deprivation occurred without due process of law. Parratt had established that if there was no practical way to afford the plaintiff a predeprivation hearing, a postdeprivation hearing provided at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner would satisfy due process requirements. The Rutledge court determined that the remedies available in the state courts, having already been pursued by the plaintiff and absent any suggestion that they were deficient, were sufficient such that the alleged deprivation was not without due process of law. We note, however, that there is no requirement that the available state remedies actually have been pursued by the plaintiff. The Parratt court relied on the mere existence of state tort procedures to find that due process requirements had been satisfied.
In Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Michigan, 1983), the court assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs' liberty interests had been implicated. The plaintiffs in Barnier brought a section 1983 action against the city, police department, and individual officers, alleging assault and battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution and deprivation of their due process, equal protection and eighth amendment rights in violation of federal statutory law. The court dismissed the federal statutory claims holding that since plaintiffs were provided adequate state tort remedies, they were not denied due process of law.
We may assume, as did the courts cited above, that the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment liberty interests were implicated here. The plaintiff has not, however, established that this deprivation occurred without due process of law. The process provided by the state to the plaintiff does comport with constitutional requirements. Since the plaintiff has available a number of tort remedies, including false arrest, malicious prosecution and defamation, and there has been no suggestion that the state tort remedies are in any way inadequate in this case, due process has been satisfied. Even if less relief was afforded to the plaintiff under state law than would be available to him under section 1983, it is sufficient so long as the state remedies are "adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process." Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544.
Therefore, even taking the material allegations of the Complaint as admitted, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
An appropriate order will issue.
AND NOW, this 11th day of February, 1985, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.
© 1992-2004 VersusLaw Inc.