than in the other contexts in which plaintiff raises it.
Thus, the issue is whether defendants' conduct satisfies the standards set by the Fourteenth Amendment independently of state law. It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment requires some process of periodic review in cases of administrative confinement. See Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. at 874 n. 9; Mims v. Shapp, 744 F.2d 946, at 950-952 (3d Cir.1984). It does not follow, however, that similar procedures are constitutionally required when, as here, an inmate has been confined pursuant to a full disciplinary hearing. The inmates in Hewitt and Mims were arguably confined without the benefit of the sort of procedures required by Wolff v. McDonnell. See Hewitt, 103 S. Ct. at 874 (noting that record did not clearly demonstrate that a Wolff hearing was held); Mims, at 949 ("no hearing preceded" inmate's assignment to solitary confinement). Subsequent periodic review was thus necessary precisely because no Wolff-style hearing was held before, or soon after, confining the inmate. See Hewitt, 103 S. Ct. at 874 n. 9; Mims, at 951-952. In effect, the review procedures serve to prevent the use of administrative confinement, over which prison officials have such broad discretion in the first instance, as "a pretext for indefinite confinement of the inmate." Hewitt, 103 S. Ct. at 874 n. 9.
No such danger exists in cases where Wolff procedures are followed at or near the beginning of confinement. In such cases, the inmate is assured notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the carrying out of the sentence of solitary confinement. Moreover, that "sentence" is of some definite duration (here, six months), and is thus altogether different from the open-ended confinement at issue in Hewitt and Mims. These differences reinforce the conclusion that no constitutional requirement of periodic review exists once the Wolff procedures are employed. Certainly Wolff itself does not support such a requirement: despite the absence of any administrative review procedure in the challenged state scheme, the Court refrained from requiring any administrative review as a constitutional matter. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565, 94 S. Ct. at 2979.
Even if the due process requirements of Hewitt and Mims applied in this matter, those requirements were met by defendants. Plaintiff concedes that he received at least three reviews of his confinement status during the roughly four months he was in RHU. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 11-13. Cf. Hewitt, 103 S. Ct. at 874 n. 9 (inmate received a single informal review one month after confinement; such review was "sufficient to dispel any notions that the confinement was a pretext"). Plaintiff nevertheless argues that these reviews did not satisfy the dictates of due process, because no review took place for the first seven weeks of his confinement. Nothing in either Hewitt or Mims, however, suggests that a seven-week delay is constitutionally impermissible. I therefore find that the review procedures satisfied due process.
VI. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint
My disposition of defendants' motion for summary judgment largely resolves the issues posed by plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. In support of his motion to amend, plaintiff argues that Magistrate Hall read the original complaint too narrowly, and consequently plaintiff's due process claims were not adequately addressed in the Magistrate's report. The amended complaint, it is said, sets forth plaintiff's claims with greater clarity, and will thus aid the court's understanding of the issues raised by those claims.
There is nothing in Magistrate Hall's report to suggest that he did not consider the full range of plaintiff's due process claims. Moreover, those same claims have been fully considered and rejected here. Clarification at this point is therefore superfluous.
In addition to restating the original claims, the motion to amend seeks to add both new defendants and new legal theories, based both on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and on state law. The new defendants, like the original defendants, are officials who participated in or had some responsibility for plaintiff's disciplinary confinement. The federal claims against the new defendants are, as a result, essentially no different from those raised against the original defendants. In the course of deciding defendants' motion for summary judgment, I have considered these claims as to the original defendants. It would be futile to permit plaintiff to keep his due process claims alive against a new set of defendants, when the underlying basis for those claims has already been deemed legally insufficient. See Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 348, 78 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1983).
The federal claims asserted in the proposed amended complaint do differ from those considered in this opinion in one respect: the amended complaint alleges that the facts in this case give rise to a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The asserted equal protection claim is a novel one, never having been raised before plaintiff's motion to amend.
Plaintiff's equal protection theory is in fact no different from his due process theory. No facts are alleged in the amended complaint which might tend to support a finding of discrimination of some sort; rather, plaintiff continues to allege that he was confined mistakenly and without the benefit of proper procedures. Nowhere does plaintiff allege his treatment was different from that afforded other prisoners similarly situated.
In other words, plaintiff's amended complaint, insofar as it states a federal claim for relief, states a claim based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim has now been judged insufficient as a matter of law. It would be senseless to allow plaintiff to restate this same claim under a different label which has no apparent application to the alleged facts. See Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir.) (leave to amend may be denied when amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 348, 78 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1983). See also O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1976) ("when a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 supplies facts to support his claim, [the court is not required] to conjure up unpleaded facts that might turn a frivolous claim of unconstitutional action into a substantial one"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S. Ct. 2173, 53 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1977).
The state law claims contained in the proposed amended complaint arise out of the same events as the federal claims discussed in this opinion. Having rejected the federal law claims, I hereby decline to exercise the court's pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966).
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint is denied, and defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. An order to that effect accompanies this Opinion.
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