allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over a person "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States." Thus, the reach of the Pennsylvania statute is co-extensive with the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223, 78 S. Ct. 199 (1957), the Supreme Court held that due process is not violated when a suit is based on a contract which has substantial contact with the forum. 355 U.S. at 223; see Ruggieri v. General Well Service, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982); DiCesare-Engler Productions, Inc. v. Mainman Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703 (W.D. Pa. 1979). The suit in McGee involved an insurance contract. The substantial connection upon which jurisdiction was based included the following factors: (1) the contract was delivered in the forum; (2) the insurance premiums were mailed from the forum; and (3) the insured was a resident of the forum when he died.
In this case the agreement and defendant itself have no less substantial contact with Pennsylvania than the contract and defendant had with the forum in McGee. The agreement was entered into by plaintiff, a corporation incorporated in Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in Mifflinburg, Pennsylvania. Negotiations regarding some of the terms of the agreement, including the commission rate, were initiated by defendant and took place at plaintiff's offices in Mifflinburg.
As a result of plaintiff's successful performance under the agreement pharmaceutical products are now sent into Pennsylvania to service the Alcoa account.
With regard to the shipment into Pennsylvania contact, defendant contends that the servicing of the Alcoa account in Pennsylvania is done by its subsidiary NPNJ and that under Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 69 L. Ed. 634, 45 S. Ct. 250 (1925), this contact cannot be considered in determining whether defendant is subject to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. This contention must be rejected.
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which indicates that pursuant to the agreement with defendant it secured the Alcoa account for defendant, not for NPNJ.
How NPNJ became involved in servicing the Alcoa account is unclear from the present record. Nevertheless, since the court is to resolve all ambiguity and disputes in favor of plaintiff at this stage of the proceedings the court determines that even if NPNJ is the corporation servicing the Alcoa account in Pennsylvania it would be doing so on behalf of defendant, the party which plaintiff alleges is the one for which the Alcoa account was secured. This activity by NPNJ on behalf of defendant amounts to defendant purposefully availing itself of doing business in Pennsylvania, albeit through its subsidiary. See Lucas v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 666 F.2d 800, 806 (3d Cir. 1981) (factors to consider in determining jurisdiction over foreign corporation which has a subsidiary doing business in forum include whether subsidiary plays a part in transaction at issue); Allen Organ Company v. Kawai Musical Instruments, 593 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 490 (D. Kan. 1978).
Based on the foregoing, the court determines that plaintiff has satisfied its burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and that requiring defendant to defend the action in this forum will not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
An appropriate Order will be entered.
AND NOW, TO WIT, this 6th day of September, 1984, IT IS ORDERED that defendant National Pharmacies, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction is denied.