which house persons convicted of serious crimes cannot be free from discomfort. Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at 349, 101 S. Ct. at 2400. As long as the conditions within the cell meet Eighth Amendment standards, no constitutional violation is present. Therefore, the Court has determined the allegations concerning the physical conditions do not either singly, or in combination, approach constitutional inadequacy.
The plaintiff next contends that the policy of denying S.H.U. inmates participation in group worship contravenes his right to worship as guaranteed by the First Amendment. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1877-78, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979), the Supreme Court noted that prisoners do not lose all constitutional protection by reason of conviction and confinement. However, prisoners' rights are subject to restrictions and limitations and that "even when an institutional restriction infringes a specific guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the practice must be evaluated in light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding prison security." Id. at 547, 99 S. Ct. at 1878 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977), Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974), and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974). In St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.1980), the court determined that a "reasonable justification" concept for such a prison practice is not appropriate when evaluating a restriction of a constitutional right. It explained " 'reasonableness' imposed too rigid a burden on prison authorities . . . the state needs only to produce evidence that to permit the exercise of first amendment rights would create a potential danger to institutional security."
At the pretrial conference, it was explained plaintiff was initially confined in the S.H.U. pending investigation of a variety of disciplinary charges, including assault on a staff member. The remainder of his time there was in response to conviction on those charges. The court can think of no more serious threat to prison security than an assault on the prison staff. Prison officials must be able to detain prisoners pending investigation of serious charges which threaten the internal stability of the institution. Conditions encountered during detention were a direct response to the increased security threat posed by the inmate awaiting a hearing before the prison's disciplinary committee. The court cannot say that a policy of preventing potentially explosive inmates from mixing with the general population at a group worship service is not a policy without justification.
The court must defer to the expert judgment of the prison officials unless the prisoner proves by "substantial evidence . . . that the officials have exaggerated their response" to security considerations or the officials beliefs are unreasonable. Id. at 115 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495; Jones, supra, 97 S. Ct. at 2539). The discussion at the pretrial conference demonstrated the propriety of the prison officials' actions and that it was not exaggerated under the circumstances. Accordingly, plaintiff's First Amendment claim will be dismissed.
Additionally, the plaintiff complains that he was required to share his cell with another inmate. The Special Housing Unit at the prison is utilized for the confinement of inmates awaiting disciplinary hearings, inmates actually being punished, inmates there for security reasons and inmates anticipating transfer to another institution. The cell-sharing here was obviously necessitated by the volume of the prisoners confined in the Unit and is "justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S. Ct. 1049, 92 L. Ed. 1356 (1948). In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S. Ct. at 1877, Justice Rehnquist emphasized: "Maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees. Central to all other correction goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves. Pell v. Procunier, supra, [417 U.S. at 823, 94 S. Ct. at 2804]; see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, supra, [433 U.S. at 129, 97 S. Ct. at 2539]; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 [94 S. Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224] (1974)."
In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, the Supreme Court held that, in and of itself, double celling is not unconstitutional. Prisoners spend most of the day in their cells. The amount of living space which is ideal for one inmate is not always attainable in the real world of prison administration. One cannot expect prison officials to anticipate the number of prisoners who will need to be separated from other inmates and still insure that each prisoner receives his own cell. "There must be a mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935.
In the case sub judice, as in Rhodes, the double-celling did not lead to deprivations of medical care, food or sanitation. There was no allegation of increased violence as a result of double-celling. The court has determined the cell in the Unit have adequate heating, ventilation and lighting. Therefore, plaintiff's claim of a constitutional violation due to double-celling will be dismissed.
With respect to the plaintiff's stay in disciplinary segregation, he asserts the denial of his personal property and the necessity to wear cloth slippers as Eighth Amendment violations. He claims he was denied his personal property for approximately one week. This was explained at the conference as the time necessary to remove the property from plaintiff's cell in general population, inventory it and have it transferred to the S.H.U. Prison officials also stated plaintiff was given whatever hygienic products he needed to maintain himself while his property was being transferred.
Inmates in disciplinary segregation are not permitted to wear their own shoes, but are given cloth slippers with rubber soles to be worn during confinement. The denial of their own shoes, prison officials explained at the conference, is attributed to the frequency of prisoners using their shoes as an object to throw at prison staff members. Since plaintiff was given shoes, although not the ones he would have liked during his confinement in disciplinary segregation, the court finds no constitutional violation.
Finally, the plaintiff alleges the conditions in administrative detention constituted cruel and unusual punishment due to the lack of recreation and educational opportunities, diminished telephone and television privileges and inadequate access to entertainment and the general library. The plaintiff does not allege that he is denied the opportunity for recreation. Under prison policy, he is allowed one hour of exercise a day, five days a week. He contends that this amount of exercise is insufficient.
It is true that inmates need regular exercise to maintain reasonably good physical and psychological health. See Dorrough v. Hogan, 563 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir.1977); Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354, 1367-69 (N.D.N.Y.1977), Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 332 (M.D.Ala.1976), Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107 (D.Conn.1973). In Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir.1979), the court found that where prisoners were confined for a period of years, prison officials must provide one hour of outdoor exercise five days a week, unless inclement weather, unusual circumstances or disciplinary needs made that impossible. This court also finds that one hour of exercise, five days a week is sufficient where all other conditions in the unit are adequate, as was shown here.
With regard to educational opportunities, and the balance of the plaintiff's claims concerning administrative detention, it is true that some opportunities and privileges given to members of the general population are not afforded inmates confined in the S.H.U. However, if the prisoner is furnished with reasonably adequate basic necessities (e.g. food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety), so as to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, prison official's obligations under the Eighth Amendment are satisfied. The Constitution does not require that prisoners, as individuals or as a group, be provided with any and every amenity a prisoner may think is needed to avoid mental, physical or emotional distress. Newman, supra, at 291. The plaintiff was afforded the basic human needs required by the Eighth Amendment. The court finds that the restrictions the plaintiff had to endure during his stay in administrative detention -- lack of educational programs, diminished access to the general library, denial of participation in group entertainment programs, limited use of the telephone -- were a necessary part of prison security and do not amount to an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
Therefore, the plaintiff's claims will be denied and his complaint dismissed.
An appropriate Order will enter.