Not what you're
looking for? Try an advanced search.
Buy This Entire Record For
SHARON STEEL CORP. v. VJR CO.
July 19, 1984
THE SHARON STEEL CORPORATION and THE CARPENTERTOWN COAL & COKE COMPANY, Plaintiffs,
THE VJR COMPANY and JAMES COOK, SR., Defendants
The opinion of the court was delivered by: WEBER
Defendants in this antitrust action have filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This Motion is in response to Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint which allege a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Both parties have supplied the Court with briefs supporting their respective positions in regard to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. In addition, Defendants have filed a supplemental Reply To Plaintiffs' Response in which they request an Order directing discovery for a period of thirty days limited to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed. Plaintiffs oppose this suggestion. For the reasons stated below, we will deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as well as their request for a period of limited discovery.
Defendants' Motion must be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). In deciding Rule 12 Motions, the Court must rely solely on averments in the Complaint and Amended Complaint. Defendants allege that these averments lack any factual basis on which the Court can conclude that it has subject matter jurisdiction since Plaintiffs do not allege any nexus between the bid rigging activities alleged and interstate commerce. The Court disagrees with this analysis, and believes that the Complaint sets forth sufficient effect on interstate commerce to support subject matter jurisdiction. The trucking and hauling activities performed by Defendants on behalf of Carpentertown, though local in nature, meet the "substantial and adverse effect" requirement as interpreted in the Third Circuit's decisions. Cardio-Medical Associates, Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir. 1983); Thomas Englert d/b/a Northeast Electrical Inspection Agency v. City of McKeesport, et al., 736 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1984). The fact that Defendants were being paid to perform the trucking and hauling activities by a facility which itself is engaged in the mining, production, purchasing and sale of coal in interstate commerce satisfies the Sherman Act's jurisdictional requirements.
AND NOW this 19th day of July 1984, in accordance with the accompanying Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of Defendants to Dismiss is DENIED. This decision renders Defendants' request for a limitation on discovery moot.
© 1992-2004 VersusLaw ...
Buy This Entire Record For