Rubin v. Lustro Tile Products Corp., 411 Pa. 549, 553-554, 192 A.2d 731, 733 (1963); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1003 (7) (1964). From such evidence the jury could find the parties intended a reasonable period of employment.
As an alternative basis for relief, Hansrote claimed that if his employment with Amer was at will, his discharge was in violation of public policy and therefore actionable. In Geary v. United States Steel, 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) Pennsylvania recognized a cause of action for the discharge of an at will employee in violation of public policy. Although Amer contends Delaware law applies because this contract was to be performed in Delaware, Amer has failed to show that Delaware law differs from Pennsylvania law. The recent Delaware cases cited by Amer merely address the modification of at will employment by an employee handbook or a stock agreement. The Court's research disclosed no Delaware case either recognizing or refusing to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge. For these reasons, it was assumed Hansrote could maintain an action for wrongful discharge under the law of either jurisdiction.
Hansrote claimed Amer conditioned his employment with Amer on his improperly influencing his then employer, Westinghouse, to award a bid to Amer. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4108(a) makes the acceptance of a commercial bribe a criminal offense. Similarly 11 Del. C.A. §§ 881(1) and 882(1) make the giving and receipt of a commercial bribe a criminal offense. The public policy of both Pennsylvania and Delaware imposes a duty on an employer to refrain from discharging an employee who refuses to commit criminal acts at the behest of his employer. There was evidence from which the jury could find that Amer terminated its employment relationship with Hansrote because Hansrote refused to participate in Amer's unlawful and unethical conduct.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Amer's motion for judgment n.o.v. will be denied. An appropriate order shall issue.
AND NOW June 7, 1984 in accordance with the foregoing memorandum opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. is denied.
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