Appeal from the Order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole in case of Ronald Kamerer, dated May 16, 1983.
Francis M. Socha, Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner.
Arthur R. Thomas, Assistant Chief Counsel, with him, Robert A. Greevy, Chief Counsel, Jay C. Waldman, General Counsel, and LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General, for respondent.
President Judge Crumlish, Jr. and Judges Colins and Blatt, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Blatt.
[ 82 Pa. Commw. Page 402]
Robert Kamerer, the petitioner, appeals here a decision of the Board of Probation and Parole (Board) which ordered that he be recommitted as a technical parole violator for transgressing specific conditions
[ 82 Pa. Commw. Page 403]
of parole, which were: a) to refrain from owning or possessing firearms or other weapons; and b) to refrain from any assaultive behavior.*fn1
The skeleton facts of the case are as follows: While on parole, the petitioner was drinking at a tavern with a friend when an altercation developed among petitioner, his friend, and other persons. Everyone involved then proceeded "outside", and the verbal exchange developed into fisticuffs. At some time during the commotion, the petitioner acquired possession of a knife, where and when he got it being disputed and unknown. Shortly thereafter, the local authorities arrived and arrested the petitioner.
On January 21, 1983, the Board lodged a detainer warrant against the petitioner for violating the aforementioned technical conditions of parole, and, on May 16, 1983, the Board found him guilty of all charges. After his subsequent petition for administrative relief was denied on May 24, 1983, the instant appeal ensued.
The petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence on the record to support the Board's findings. Our scope of review, of course, is limited to determining whether or not constitutional rights were violated, findings made by the agency were supported by substantial evidence, and conclusions reached by the agency were in accordance with the law. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704. Moreover, we have previously defined substantial evidence as evidence which would convince a reasonable mind to a fair degree of certainty. Vovakes v. Department of Transportation, 71 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 3, 453 A.2d 1072 (1982). The narrow question presented
[ 82 Pa. Commw. Page 404]
for review, therefore, is whether or not there is substantial evidence on the record to ...