No. 173 Philadelphia, 1983, No. 174 Philadelphia, 1983, Appeals from the Orders of the Court of Common Pleas, Northampton County, Civil Division, at No. 1980-C9044 DR-48781.
Donald S. Himmelreich, Easton, for appellant.
Richard J. Shiroff, Easton, for appellee.
Cavanaugh, Brosky and Popovich, JJ. Cavanaugh and Popovich, JJ., file concurring statements.
[ 328 Pa. Super. Page 192]
This is a consolidated appeal from orders setting the amount of child support, alimony pendente lite and counsel fees and costs to be paid by appellant. Five issues are raised for our review: first, that the order regarding alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and costs is appealable; second, that the alimony pendente lite award should not have been made retroactive; third and fourth, that the court below erred in imputing an excessive amount of appellant's corporate assets as personal earning capacity and in not considering appellee's assets vis-a-vis the alimony
[ 328 Pa. Super. Page 193195]
Pa. Super. 155 at 157-8, 170 A.2d 602 at 602-3 (1961) this Court stated the standard for appellate review in these cases.
How much shall be allowed as alimony and for counsel fees and expenses is a matter of judicial discretion and the validity of the order depends upon the proper exercise of that discretion . . .
This court will not reverse an order of the court below "except for plain abuse of discretion" . . . Brong v. Brong, 129 Pa. Super. 224, 195 A. 439.
A review of the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas and of the record reveals no such abuse of discretion and, accordingly, we reject appellant's claims as to the amount of the alimony pendente lite award. However, since we are remanding for a hearing on the child support matter, we do not reach the merits of appellant's arguments vis-a-vis the support award.
Appellant also contends that the court below erred in failing to hold a requested de novo hearing on the child support matter. We agree.
It is not disputed that appellant requested a de novo hearing before the trial court after the determination made by the court's domestic relations office; nor that such a hearing did not take place. Two matters remain: does appellant have a right to a de novo hearing and, if so, were any ...