The opinion of the court was delivered by: BECHTLE
This action involves federal antitrust claims and pendent state law claims. Presently before the court are defendants' two motions for summary judgment.
For the reasons stated herein, the motions for summary judgment will be granted on the antitrust claims and the remaining state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
In order that there be a better understanding of this case, a brief review of the facts and relationships of the parties is necessary. In 1959, plaintiff Tunis Brothers Company, Inc. ("Tunis Brothers"), located in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania, became a Ford Motor Company ("Ford") franchised dealership selling tractors.
The dealership was owned and operated by Richard and Isabelle Tunis.
In March 1980, Richard Tunis was approached by plaintiffs Richard N. de la Rigaudiere ("de la Rigaudiere") and David C. Smith ("Smith") in their attempt to buy the business. Eventually, sometime in late 1980, Richard and Isabelle Tunis agreed to sell the business to de la Rigaudiere and Smith.
In May 1981, prior to the sale of the business, de la Rigaudiere and Smith met with defendant John Watson ("Watson"), a zone manager for Ford, for the purpose of discussing the transfer of the Ford franchise to them once Richard and Isabelle Tunis sold the business. The parties met at Wenner Ford Tractor, Inc. ("Wenner Ford"). Wenner Ford is the Ford tractor dealership nearest to Tunis Brothers and has as its president and chief executive, defendant John S. Wenner ("Wenner").
During the meeting, which included lunch at the Concordville Inn, Watson indicated that Ford did not intend to have a franchised dealership selling tractors in Kennett Square after Tunis Brothers was sold but rather, was interested in having a franchised dealership in the Cochranville/Oxford area 15 miles west of Kennett Square.
Later, in June 1980, plaintiffs de la Rigaudiere and Smith met with Watson's supervisors, defendant Eugene W. Fraher ("Fraher") and his associate, Edward Poole, in Cohoes, New York. At that time Fraher was District Manager for the Northeastern District of Ford Tractor Division. At the meeting Fraher confirmed what plaintiffs had been told regarding Ford's plan to eliminate its Kennett Square franchise once Tunis Brothers was sold. Despite this, plaintiffs were asked to submit financial information and a business plan containing their proposals for operating a franchised dealership.
On December 16, 1980, Richard and Isabelle Tunis and de la Rigaudiere and Smith signed an Agreement of Sale for Tunis Brothers. Performance of the agreement was not conditioned on plaintiffs obtaining Ford's approval to continue the Tunis Brothers dealership as a Ford franchised dealership. In early 1981 plaintiffs sent to Ford the plan requested by Fraher during the June 1980 meeting. On March 3, 1981, defendants Hugh Nickel ("Nickel") and Douglas N. Crawford ("Crawford"), both employees of Ford, met with de la Rigaudiere and Smith in Kennett Square to obtain more application information for: 1) a franchised dealership; and 2) credit from defendant Ford Motor Credit Company ("Ford Credit").
The closing of the sale of Tunis Brothers took place on March 13, 1981. By letter dated March 17, 1981, Richard Tunis sent Ford his letter of resignation. Defendant Kenneth E. Harris ("Harris"), Market Representative Manager of the Northern Region of Ford Motor Company's Tractor Division, did not process the resignation letter, but rather, held the resignation pending a decision on plaintiffs' applications.
In May 1981, de la Rigaudiere and Smith were informed that their credit application had not been approved by Ford Credit. However, since the decision had been based on erroneous financial information, plaintiffs were permitted to submit a new credit application to Ford Credit. By letter dated August 7, 1981, defendant E. S. Hasel ("Hasel"), Regional Manager of the Northern Region of Ford Motor Company's Tractor Division, advised de la Rigaudiere and Smith that Ford would not approve their application for a franchised dealership in Kennett Square. Subsequently, plaintiffs became, and still are, an Allis-Chalmers dealership selling Allis-Chalmers tractors at Tunis Brothers.
On December 2, 1982, plaintiffs Tunis Brothers, de la Rigaudiere and Smith filed a complaint in this court. The plaintiffs' claims, as discussed below, are based on section 1 of the Sherman Act and state law.
Counts I through IV are based on the federal antitrust laws. More specifically, Counts I, III and IV are based on an alleged conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In these counts plaintiffs allege that all the defendants conspired for the purposes of terminating Tunis Brothers as a Ford franchised dealership and preventing plaintiffs de la Rigaudiere and Smith, as new owners of Tunis Brothers, from operating their dealership as a Ford franchised dealership (hereinafter referred to as the "conspiracy").
The conspiracy, plaintiffs claim, was formed with the intent to eliminate or substantially decrease competition with defendant Wenner Ford.
Count II is also based on section 1 of the Sherman Act. In this count, however, plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a conspiracy but rather contend that a 1974 franchise agreement between Ford and Tunis Brothers which governed the parties' relationship after 1974 was a contract in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce.
Count V and VI are state law claims over which this court has pendent jurisdiction. In Count V plaintiffs allege a number of different theories upon which they claim defendants are liable. As plaintiffs have stated, Count V of the complaint is "based upon fraud and other tortious conduct."
Count VI is a contract claim in which plaintiffs allege that Ford breached the franchise agreement and that all the other defendants aided or abetted Ford in breaching the franchise agreement.
In ruling on defendants' motions for summary judgment, this court is aware that summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Additionally, this court is aware that due to the complexity of many antitrust cases summary judgment is used sparingly in such cases. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 7 L. Ed. 2d 458, 82 S. Ct. 486 (1962). Nevertheless, summary judgment, if otherwise justified, ...