plaintiffs did not sign the motion. In any event, the disposition of the City's motion for summary judgment renders plaintiffs' cross-motion moot. Accordingly, the accompanying Orders deny the motion for a continuance of plaintiffs in Fishman, McCready, Calvanese, and Nilan as moot. The similar motion of plaintiff in Sieracki will also be denied as moot.
(4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their Complaints
Counsel for the Fishman, McCready, and Nilan plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their complaints as well as the complaint in Calvanese. The propose to add defendants Meehan and the Republican City Committee as defendants on Count I of these complaints alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Meehan and the Republican City Committee object to these amendments, relying on the Court of Appeals' recent decision in Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.1984). Cruz, in my view, contains a negative pregnant implication that if plaintiff can show "a system permitting private parties to substitute their judgment for that of a state official or body, a private actor's mere invocation of state power renders that party's conduct actionable under § 1983." Cruz, at 82. Plaintiffs in Fishman, McCready, Calvanese, and Nilan have made such an allegation. While imposition of section 1983 liability under these circumstances may pose certain First Amendment issues akin to the prudential concerns adverted to in my December 27, 1983, decision concerning defendants' liability under section 1985(3), plaintiffs should have the opportunity to conduct discovery to establish the precise nature of their section 1983 claims before I rule on their legal sufficiency. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motions to amend the complaints in Fishman, McCready, and Nilan will be granted. Plaintiffs in those cases will have until March 23, 1984 to file amended complaints.
The court will hold the motion in Calvanese under advisement. If counsel for plaintiffs in that case ratifies the motion made in that case by counsel for the Fishman, McCready, and Nilan plaintiffs by March 28, plaintiffs in Calvanese shall have until the following Friday, March 30, to file a similar amendment.
(5) Residual Claims Under Section 1985(3)
On December 27, 1983, this court held that conspiracies to deprive an individual of equal protection of the laws based upon his political affiliations were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Nilan v. De Meo, 575 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.Pa.1983). I thereupon dismissed Count II of the Second Amended Complaint in Fishman, the Third Amended Complaint in McCready, the Amended Complaint in Calvanese, and the Complaint in Nilan.
For precisely the reasons given in this court's December 27 ruling, the claim under section 1985(3) made by Mr. Sieracki in No. 82-5489 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Caliguri plaintiffs do not allege a conspiracy against them based upon their political affiliations. Instead, the Caliguri complaint alleges a conspiracy motivated by an anti-union animus. An anti-union animus, like an political animus, does not suffice to state a claim under section 1985(3). United Brotherhood of Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 103 S. Ct. 3352, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1983); Fiske v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 568 F. Supp. 590 (N.D.Ga.1983). Both United Brotherhood and Fiske involved claims of discrimination on the basis of union activism. Accordingly, Count II of the Amended Complaint in Caliguri will also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(6) Claims Under Section 1986
A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 for failure to prevent a deprivation of equal protection in violation of section 1985 requires as its predicate a viable claim under section 1985. I have dismissed all section 1985 claims. Accordingly, I will also dismiss all section 1986 claims.
(7) Meehan and Republican City Committee's Motion to Dismiss or for Transfer
Defendants William Meehan and the Republican City Committee have moved to dismiss the pendent state claims against them in Fishman, McCready, Calvanese, and Nilan. They raise two arguments. First, they contend that this court should not assert pendent jurisdiction over these claims. Second, Mr. Meehan and the Republican City Committee assert that plaintiffs' claims for tortious interference with business relationships and for intentional infliction of emotional distress do not state claims upon which relief can be granted under Pennsylvania law.
At the time that Mr. Meehan and the Republican City Committee moved to dismiss the pendent claims against them, I had dismissed the only federal claim asserted against these two parties by plaintiffs in these four cases. Nilan v. De Meo, 575 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.Pa.1983). I have now granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints so as to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against these two defendants. Accordingly, I will retain pendent jurisdiction over the state claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966).
(8) Discovery Scheduling
By letter dated April 14, 1983, counsel for all parties in all cases except Nilan agreed to a discovery schedule. A copy of this letter is attached to this Memorandum. This plan for discovery seems appropriate to the court with a few modifications.
First, the joint discovery schedule should apply to Nilan as well as the other actions. This presents no practical problem since counsel for the Nilan plaintiffs subscribed to the April 14 agreement in their capacities as counsel for plaintiffs in Fishman, McCready, and Caliguri.
Second, the City of Philadelphia and the private defendants, William Meehan and the Republican City Committee, have expressed a significant interest in avoiding participation in the depositions of all plaintiffs. Defendants going to trial will have to take those depositions properly to prepare for trial. The City and the private defendants, however, expect that after limited discovery they will be ready to submit what they believe will be successful motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the parties agreed at conference to concentrate early discovery on the issues raised by the City's motion for summary judgment, denied today, and the issues raised by private defendants' motions to amend complaints, denied today. This may entail a modification of paragraph 2 of the April 14 agreement. In any event, discovery on the City's participation in any allegedly improper activity shall be completed in the first sixty days following entry of the accompanying Orders. Discovery on the private defendants' issues shall be completed in the first ninety days following entry of the accompanying Orders.
Because the court cannot instantaneously rule on complicated motions for summary judgment, the earlier the parties can complete discovery on the City's and the private defendants' preliminary issues, the more quickly those parties' statuses can be resolved. An early resolution will either allow those parties to avoid further preparation of these cases for trial or it will force those parties to participate in that preparation whole-heartedly.