Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

MT. JOY TOWNSHIP v. DAVIES USED AUTO PARTS ET AL. (03/07/84)

decided: March 7, 1984.

MT. JOY TOWNSHIP, ADAMS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, APPELLANT
v.
DAVIES USED AUTO PARTS ET AL., APPELLEES



Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County in the case of Davies Used Auto Parts, a division of Starjoy, Inc. and the Mt. Joy Township Concerned Citizens Group, by Thomas Reaver and Richard E. Munshour, Trustees ad litem v. Mt. Joy Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania, No. 80-S-690.

COUNSEL

Samuel E. Teeter, Teeter, Teeter & Teeter, for appellant.

Kenneth Lee Rotz, John Wills Beach, P.C., for appellees.

Judges Rogers, Craig and Colins, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Rogers.

Author: Rogers

[ 80 Pa. Commw. Page 633]

Mt. Joy Township has appealed from a final order of the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County entered against it in an action for declaratory judgment brought by local junkyard interests. The court declared Section 10 of the township's junkyard regulatory

[ 80 Pa. Commw. Page 634]

    ordinance to be invalid. Section 10 of the ordinance is attached hereto as an appendix.

Mt. Joy Township is a Township of the Second Class. The junkyard ordinance was enacted pursuant to Section 702, cl. LVIII of the Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. § 65758, which empowers townships of the second class "[t]o regulate and license junk dealers and the establishment and maintenance of junk yards and scrap yards including, but not limited to, automobile junk or grave yards and to prescribe license fees therefor not to exceed two hundred dollars per year."

The court of common pleas founded its decision to invalidate Section 10 on the principle that the provisions of ordinances which are essentially zoning regulations must be adopted as, and provided with, the apparatus associated with zoning ordinances, such as comprehensive plans, zoning hearing boards and the procedural devices by which the zoning power is exerted and administered.

The authorities for the principle just described are the cases of Board of Supervisors of Upper Frederick Township v. Moland Development Company, Inc., 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 207, 339 A.2d 141 (1975) and Board of Supervisors of Franklin Township v. Meals, 57 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 129, 426 A.2d 1200 (1981). The ordinance which we held offended the principle in the Moland case was entitled the "Upper Frederick Township Regulation of Lot Size and Sewage Disposal Ordinance" and ordained a minimum lot size, frontage, lot depth, and front, rear and side yard dimensional requirements for structures used or proposed to be used for human habitation throughout the township. It also made provision for exceptions for hardship. In Meals, the offending ordinance was entitled the "Township Building Permit Ordinance" and it required a thirty-five foot setback for all buildings

[ 80 Pa. Commw. Page 635]

    thereafter constructed in the township. In both we held that the ordinances were essentially zoning enactments and were invalid because they did not provide the "procedural safeguards" which must accompany zoning ordinances. Neither case concerned a junkyard; and the legal defense of each ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.