in the complaint and the proposed amended complaint. The burden then rests on the plaintiffs to establish the facts which support personal jurisdiction over the defendant. DiCesare-Engler Productions, Inc. v. Mainman Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703 (W.D.Pa. 1979).
Although plaintiffs allege in their proposed amended complaint that Revco of North Carolina is subject to personal jurisdiction because it does business in Pennsylvania, they have provided no evidentiary material to support this allegation.
Plaintiffs have provided evidence that Revco Drug, the reputed parent corporation, distributes products in Pennsylvania and is therefore doing business in the Commonwealth. This is not denied by the defendant. The question is whether activity by a parent corporation in a forum will subject a subsidiary corporation to personal jurisdiction.
Usually this issue arises in the reverse situation; an attempt to attribute the acts of a subsidiary to the parent for purposes of acquiring personal jurisdiction. E.g. Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980); Mizokami Bros. of Arizona, Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1977); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1975); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). However, the situation presented by the instant case has been addressed previously. Uston v. Grand Resorts, Inc., 564 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1977); Gutierrez v. Raymond International, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Associated Metals and Minerals Corp. v. S.S. Rialto, 280 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
In either case, we begin with the presumption of separate corporate existence and consequently, separate liability. E.g. Escude Cruz, 619 F.2d 902; Uston, 564 F.2d 1217. The party asserting jurisdiction must establish an identity of the two entities which justifies attributing the activities of the parent to the subsidiary. Id. Plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence to indicate that the formal independence of the three Revco corporations is not maintained in actual fact. The only fact produced is that the three Revco corporations have their offices at the same address in Ohio. There is no evidence of common officers or directors, the parent corporation's share of ownership in the subsidiaries or any indicia of control by the parent corporation. We conclude, therefore, that the activities of the parent corporation, Revco Drug, cannot support personal jurisdiction over Revco of North Carolina.
Furthermore as to the other two Revco entities, Revco Drug and Revco of Ohio, it appears that neither has control of nor operates the North Carolina store in question. The record clearly reveals that this store is solely within the aegis of Revco of North Carolina. Because this court will not permit an amendment which constitutes an exercise in futility, we will deny plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint.
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint will be denied and the action dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
An appropriate order will issue.
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