argue that Pennsylvania law would not differ, the defendant asserts that the case law within this Commonwealth is not as specific regarding contract provisions like the one at bar.
Inasmuch as this court sits as a Pennsylvania court in diversity cases, the choice of law rules of this Commonwealth must govern in this case. See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted a "flexible conflicts methodology" for tort actions. Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 n. 1 (E.D.Pa.1983); see Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). Under this analysis, which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held is applicable in contract actions as well, see Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir.1978), a court must "take . . . into account both the grouping of contacts with the various concerned jurisdictions and the interests and policies that may be validly asserted by each jurisdiction," id. at 1311. In other words, "the current rule governing breach of contract actions directs the courts to make their choice of law by means of a two-part analysis that considers both the significant contacts that the contract has with the various jurisdictions and the interest, if any, that the various jurisdictions have in the subject matter of the contract." Mashuda v. Western Beef, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 887, 891 (W.D. Pa.1981) (citations omitted).
After carefully considering both the quantitative and the qualitative contacts that the instant insurance policy has with the two jurisdictions involved, the court concludes that Pennsylvania's choice of law rules clearly dictate that the substantive law of Virginia must govern here. Quantitatively, the contract has but one contact with Pennsylvania: the plaintiff resides within this Commonwealth at the present time. At the time the policy was signed, however, the plaintiff resided and worked in Virginia. At the time, the pertinent endorsement took effect, the plaintiff lived and worked in Virginia. At the time the plaintiff allegedly suffered the injury forming the basis for his claim, he was working for Moore in Virginia.
The qualitative contacts also favor the application of Virginia law. Initially, the court notes that there are no qualitative contacts favoring the application of Pennsylvania law. While it may have been arguable at one time that the Hionis rule embodied a significant interest militating in favor of the application of Pennsylvania law, see Henning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 442, 446-47 (M.D.Pa.1982) (rejecting the argument in context of group insurance plans), the recent rejection of Hionis by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court eliminates this consideration. In contrast, the Commonwealth of Virginia quite obviously has a valid interest in seeing its substantive law applied to a group insurance plan covering Virginia residents who work for an employer in Virginia. Indeed, the fact that the policy was filed with a state agency in Virginia bears witness to the fact that a valid interest is possessed by that Commonwealth in regulating contracts of this type. Since the policy in issue has many more quantitative and qualitative contacts with Virginia than it does with Pennsylvania, the court concludes that Virginia law governs.
The court will enter an appropriate Order declaring that Virginia law governs this dispute. In addition, pursuant to the request of both parties, the court shall grant the parties fourteen (14) days in which to file a motion for summary judgment.
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