certitude that the operation of Pleasant Valley is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the (County)." Blum, Rendell-Baker, and Jackson, supra. We mentioned earlier the documents evidencing the County's intent to relinquish control over the operation of the home. Exhibit A to Affidavit of Moorehead. There was also submitted a letter from the Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare describing the home as a private entity, and telling the County exactly what should be done in order for it to be considered the "provider" for the home. See Exhibit C to Affidavit of Moorehead. The conclusion in that letter was that the home was not a facility operated by a county government or part of a county institution district under definition of Pennsylvania law. Although we do not consider that letter dispositive, we do find it instructive.
To sum up, then, we do not find a symbiotic relationship between the County and Pleasant Valley. Although there is some governmental connection it is not enough for us to say that the actions of Pleasant Valley may be fairly attributable to the State. Additionally, we find the County significantly removed from the specific acts complained of here. Thorn was fired by Moorehead, a private party acting on behalf of his employer, Ducat, Inc., another private party. Pleasant Valley's refusal to act on Thorn's termination, even if it were considered to be a state actor, is not the active participation and/or encouragement the case law requires for a finding of State action. Blum, supra.11 Shortly, there is no State action on the part of Pleasant Valley for purposes of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. DEFENDANT DUCAT, INC.'S MOTION
Because we found no state action on behalf of Pleasant Valley, the same conclusion a fortiori applies to Ducat, Inc., for several reasons. First, it, too, is a private actor, hence the analysis used in Pleasant Valley's motion is the same. Second, Ducat, Inc. is one step more removed from the County than Pleasant Valley. Third, Ducat, Inc.'s agreement was with Pleasant Valley, not the County. Accordingly, we find far less, if any, connections between the County and Ducat, Inc. than there were between the County and Pleasant Valley. If we do not find any state action on behalf of Pleasant Valley, then we certainly cannot find any on behalf of Ducat, Inc. It's motion will therefore be granted.
D. THE COUNTY OF MONROE'S MOTION
The County did not file a brief in support of its motion, and under our local rules, the motion should be deemed withdrawn. M.D.Pa. Local Rule 401.5. Nonetheless, as noted above, we are not precluded from granting summary judgment in its favor. See n. 5, supra. We base our conclusion that the County is entitled to judgment on the corollary of our ruling on the other defense motions. Since we do not find state action on behalf of Pleasant Valley and Ducat, Inc. viz a viz each other and the County, we cannot find County involvement in the activity complained of enough to satisfy § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. If Pleasant Valley and Ducat, Inc. are not joint participants with the County, then the County cannot be a joint participant with them in Thorn's dismissal. Judgment will therefore be entered in favor of the County.
There is no state action present in the actions of the Defendants in deciding to terminate Stuart Thorn. We express no opinion as to why Thorn was fired. We only conclude that the requisite government involvement was lacking, thus precluding consideration of his First and Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 claims by this court. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 837-38, 102 S. Ct. at 2769-70 (1982). Since we have no jurisdiction to review those claims, there is no longer any pendent jurisdiction over the State law claims. We therefore exercise our discretion and decline to entertain Thorn's remaining claims. Thus, the following Order is entered.
AND NOW, this 10th day of February, 1984, in accordance with the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Summary judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiff Stuart Thorn.
2. The Clerk of this Court is directed to close this case.