authenticity of these copies has been raised. It is also unquestioned that this suit was not filed until January, 1982, more than one year after the time of the alleged injury in August, 1980. Accordingly, the only question remaining for determination is whether the contractual limitation on the time for filing suit was reasonably communicated to the plaintiffs so that the defendant may rely on it. For the reasons below, we hold that it was.
The passenger contract consists of two rectangular pieces of paper printed on both sides. The face of the top piece contains the defendant's name "Klosters Rederi A/S d/b/a Norwegian Caribbean Lines," its address, and certain other information including the sailing date, cabin number, passenger names and total fare. In the bottom left-hand corner, printed in red capital letters against a white background, appears the phrase "THE PROVISIONS ON THE REVERSE HEREOF ARE INCORPORATED AS THOUGH FULLY REWRITTEN." At the top of the reverse side of this piece of paper, in large, easily readable dark type, appears the notice: "Passengers are advised to read the terms and conditions of the Passenger Contract Ticket set forth below. Acceptance of this Passenger Contract Ticket by Passenger shall constitute the Agreement of Passenger to these Terms and Conditions. NORWEGIAN CARIBBEAN LINES" Six paragraphs of terms and conditions, in small but readable type, appear on this side of the first piece of paper. Paragraphs 7-13 appear in blue type on the face of the second piece of paper; paragraph 13 contains the limitation at issue in this case. Paragraphs 14-25 are contained on the reverse of the second piece of paper.
The face of the passenger contract ticket contains a conspicuous notice directing the passenger's attention to the contractual terms contained on the inside. Under such circumstances, courts have uniformly held the passenger bound by the contractual terms contained in the contract, despite the fact that the passenger may not have read the contract. DeNicola, 642 F.2d at 10-11 (notice of terms and conditions of contract set forth in bold face type on the face of the contract; provisions appear on pages two through five in readable but fine print); Carpenter, 604 F.2d at 12 (notice printed in bold-face type on the face of the ticket; NCL was defendant shipowner); Baron v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 108 F.2d 21, 22 (2d Cir. 1939) (prominent red type on ticket called passenger's attention to limitations of liability contained in contract); Gardner v. Greek Line, 388 F. Supp. 856 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (words "important notice" appear in bold type within a box on the face of the contract; underlined type below instructs passengers to read the attached terms and conditions before accepting): McQuillan v. Italia Societa per Azione di Navigazione, 386 F. Supp. 462, 466 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) aff'd 516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975) (cover and second page of contract direct passenger's attention to conditions on following pages); Lipton v. National Hellenic American Lines, 294 F. Supp. 308, 311 (E.D. N.Y. 1968) (warnings appearing on booklet cover afford reasonable notice of existence and importance of conditions).
By contrast, those courts which have refused to enforce contractual limitations because no reasonable notice of the limitation was given have generally relied heavily on the absence of a conspicuous facial notice of the terms and conditions sought to be incorporated into the contract. Barbachym, 713 F.2d at 220 (ticket face contains only inconspicuous, vague language); Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 14 (facial warning in inconspicuous lower-case letters squeezed between two bold-faced captions); Cada v. Costa Line, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (lack of clear facial warning); Raskin v. Compania de Vapores Realma S.P., 521 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) (same). Since the passenger contract ticket received by the plaintiffs contained a conspicuous reference on its face to the terms and conditions of the contract, the contractual limitation on the time for filing suit was reasonably communicated to the plaintiffs and is binding on them.
The claim for personal injury resulting from NCL's negligence is barred because it was not instituted within one year of August, 1980, the time of injury. The defendant's motion for summary judgment will therefore be granted in the order which follows.
ORDER - February 7, 1984, Filed
AND NOW, this 6th day of February, 1984, upon consideration of the motion of the defendant, Norwegian Caribbean Lines, Inc. (NCL) to strike the plaintiffs' pleading labeled a "counterclaim," there being no opposition thereto pursuant to Local Rule 20(c), and upon consideration of NCL's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs' response thereto, for the reasons stated in this Court's Memorandum of February 6th, 1984,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The motion of the defendant, Norwegian Caribbean Lines, Inc., to strike the plaintiffs' pleading labeled a "counter-claim" is GRANTED and the pleading labeled a "counterclaim" is STRICKEN.
2. The motion of the defendant, Norwegian Caribbean Lines, Inc., for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment is ENTERED in favor of the defendant, Norwegian Caribbean Lines, Inc., and against the plaintiff, Abner Strauss (the claims of Shana Strauss, a minor by Abner Strauss and Madelyn Strauss, and of Madelyn Strauss in her own right having already been dismissed by the state court).
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