The opinion of the court was delivered by: WEBER
The unfortunate and unnecessary procedural tangle that this case has become is about to meet an inglorious end. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment in this action. Plaintiffs have since filed their second motion to remand. For the reasons stated below, we will deny plaintiffs' latest motion to remand and grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant Bell.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff Eileen Seamon has alleged in this suit that she was wrongfully forced to transfer from one Bell office to another more distant. Her original position was later filled by a less senior employee and plaintiff was not offered the option to transfer back. Plaintiff also alleges harassment by fellow employees and a supervisor.
Plaintiff Eileen Seamon originally filed a Title VII action in this court at Civil Action No. 83-245 after exhausting EEOC proceedings and receiving a right to sue notice. Bell was the sole defendant in this suit. On March 21, 1983 the action was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation and order.
On July 6, 1983, plaintiffs Eileen and Michael Seamon filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The suit named Bell Telephone and the Federation of Telephone Workers (hereinafter Union) as defendants. This complaint alleged violations of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., charging Bell and the Union with breach of the collective bargaining agreement, breach of the duty of fair representation, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Michael Seamon claimed loss of consortium.
The case was removed to this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction; specifically, plaintiffs' claims under the Federal labor laws.
Plaintiffs then filed the first of their motions to remand in which they tried in vain to contradict the plain jurisdictional language of their own complaint. This motion was denied in an opinion and order dated September 23, 1983. 571 F. Supp. 1073. We concluded at that time that plaintiffs' complaint clearly stated a federal cause of action under the LMRA.
Plaintiffs then moved to amend their complaint to drop the Union as a party defendant and recast their claims under state common law. Defendant Bell assented to this motion and it was so ordered. Furthermore, plaintiffs have explicitly abandoned the claims stated in their original complaint and judgment in favor of defendant will therefore be entered on those claims.
Defendant Bell then filed a motion for summary judgment. While defendant's motion was pending, plaintiffs filed their second motion to remand. Both matters have now been fully briefed and supported and are ripe for disposition.
Where a federal court has jurisdiction over one claim, it may exercise pendant jurisdiction over state claims in the same lawsuit. Furthermore, when the jurisdiction conferring claim is dismissed or disposed of, the court may retain pendant jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 25 L. Ed. 2d 442, 90 S. Ct. 1207 (1970); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966). This is particularly true where all the claims arise from a common nucleus of fact, and where the parties and the court have invested significant effort in the matter.
We previously concluded that plaintiffs' complaint stated a federal cause of action under the LMRA and that jurisdiction was therefore properly grounded in this court. Accordingly this court holds pendant jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state claims, particularly because they arise ...