No. 11 E.D. Appeal Docket, 1983, Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, No. 507 Philadelphia, 1981, reversing an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 43rd Judicial District, Monroe County Branch, at No. 1740-1980 Civil, Pa. Superior Ct. ,
Roberts, C.j., and Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson and Zappala, JJ. Larsen, J., dissents and would affirm on the basis of the Superior Court Opinion in this case.
At issue is the applicability of what has come to be known as the "discovery rule" to the running of a two-year statute of limitations in this case involving ascertainable injury to a tunnel owned by Pocono International Raceway, Inc. (Raceway). The Raceway instituted a civil action in trespass against Pocono Produce, Inc. (Pocono Produce) on June 27, 1980, seeking to recover for damages allegedly resulting from the negligent operation of a truck in attempting to pass through the tunnel on either June 15 or June 18, 1978.
Pocono Produce appeals from an order of the Superior Court*fn1 reversing an order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 43rd Judicial District, Monroe County, granting the motion of Pocono Produce*fn2 for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired.*fn3
In reviewing the propriety of granting summary judgment*fn4
in this case, we view the record in a light favorable to the Raceway as the non-moving party. The Raceway owns and maintains an arched steel tunnel which was used as a passage-way by pedestrians and vehicles to the Raceway's facilities. On June 15 or June 18, 1978,*fn5 structural beams in this tunnel were allegedly damaged by collision with a truck driven through the tunnel by an employee of Pocono Produce. In October, 1978, the premises were closed and the tunnel sealed until April, 1979. When reopened in early April of 1979, Joseph R. Mattioli, the Chief Executive Officer of the Raceway first learned that the tunnel had collapsed and upon his inspection, he noted the damage to the interior structural beams of the tunnel. George Ewald, who was employed full-time as a maintenance man, then told Dr. Mattioli that a refrigerated truck bearing the name "Frosty something" had been lodged in the tunnel. Knowing that the Raceway had previously purchased food from a company by the name of Frosty Acres but being unable to locate any company by that name, Dr. Mattioli contacted Edward Driebe, President of Pocono Produce, in early April 1979, for assistance in locating Frosty Acres. During their conversation, Mr. Driebe
told Dr. Mattioli that a truck driven by an employee of Pocono Produce had struck the tunnel. In its June 27, 1980 complaint instituting suit, the Raceway thus averred that it was without knowledge of the injury until early April, 1979.
On this record, the trial court granted Pocono Produce's motion for summary judgment and ruled that the Raceway's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that a two-year period of limitation began to run in mid-June, 1978, either June 15 or June 18, 1978 when the truck operated by Pocono Produce's employee collided with and damaged the structural beams in the Raceway's tunnel. In so ruling, the court rejected the Raceway's argument that the statute of limitations was tolled until April, 1979 when the Raceway discovered that the tunnel had collapsed. Motion for reconsideration was denied whereupon the Raceway appealed to the Superior Court.
Superior Court reversed the order of the Court of Common Pleas and remanded the case for trial, holding that the discovery rule was applicable and that the statute of limitations was tolled until the date the damage was reasonably ascertained by the Raceway, April 1979, ten months after the injury alleged to have caused the damages. We reverse.
As a matter of general rule, a party asserting a cause of action is under a duty to use all reasonable diligence to be properly informed of the facts and circumstances upon which a potential right of recovery is based and to institute suit within the prescribed statutory period. Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445, 450-451, 227 A.2d 833, 835 (1967); Taylor v. Tukanowicz, 290 Pa. Superior Ct. 581, 435 A.2d 181 (1981); Med-Mar, Inc. v. Dilworth, 214 Pa. Superior Ct. 402, 257 A.2d 910 (1969). Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding ...