under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It argues in its brief that defendant is a corporation formed and doing business in Pennsylvania and that it uses both federal and state funds in its projects. The extent of state funding is nowhere explained in the complaint. We do not find any infusion of state funds into the project sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement of Section 1983.
In Bethel v. Jendoco Construction Corp., 570 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals stated that there must be a sufficient nexus between the state and the challenged action so that the action of the defendant may be fairly treated as that of the state itself, or that the state itself is a joint participant in the challenged activity, citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1975), Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 32 L. Ed. 2d 627, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972); and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961). Last term the Supreme Court reaffirmed this standard in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1982), in finding that 90% funding of a nursing home by the state did not constitute the acts of the administration of the home as state action under § 1983.
Finally, plaintiff has failed to plead this claim with specificity. In this Circuit a civil rights action should be pleaded with particularity, Rodes v. Municipal Authority of the Borough of Milford, 409 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1969).
We find no basis for finding a civil rights cause of action in this complaint.
Having disposed of the federal claim we raise the question of whether any further action of remand by this court would be appropriate. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) we may remand to the state court actions "removed improvidently and without jurisdiction." This is inapplicable in the light of our finding that jurisdiction exists.
In Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1982) after a remand by the Supreme Court which found plaintiff's claim not to involve a "security" within the terms of the federal statute, the Court of Appeals directed that the pendant state claim be transferred to the state court. The action originally filed in the federal district court clearly contained pendant state claims, which could have been adjudicated because of the colorable federal securities act claims presented. However, despite a colorable federal claim in the present case, no other claims which might be designated as pendant, appear in the complaint.
In Lechtner v. Brownyard, 679 F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 1982), the Court of Appeals having found no private cause of action, remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss the entire action, including pendant claims, but with the suggestion that the district court in its order of dismissal, transfer the state law claims to the state court under the provisions of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 5103.
Subsequently, on December 20, 1982 the Pennsylvania statute was amended to allow any litigant whose claim has been dismissed in federal court for lack of jurisdiction to transfer the matter to the state court. The Pennsylvania statute thus has the effect of tolling the statute of limitations during the pendency of the federal court action.
While this ameliorating provision exists, we are uncertain of its application in the present case. We have determined the federal cause of action on the merits; the dismissal here is not for lack of jurisdiction. We cannot find the existence of any separate state law cause of action from the recitals of the complaint. See, McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1983).
The action will be dismissed for lack of a private cause of action and lack of standing of the plaintiff to sue.
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