Appeal from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in the case of Agnes Sledge v. Temple University, No. A-80155.
Robert A. Sloan, Stephen A. Sheller & Associates, for petitioner.
Howard M. Ellner, for respondents.
Judges Craig, Barry and Blatt, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Blatt.
[ 78 Pa. Commw. Page 381]
Agnes Sledge (claimant) appeals here an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) which affirmed the referee's decision to dismiss her claim petition and to grant the employer's petition to terminate benefits.
The claimant was injured in the course of her employment on June 7, 1978 and received benefits pursuant to a notice of compensation payable until June 25, 1978. She returned to work until August 2, 1978 at which time she allegedly reinjured herself in a fall at the workplace. She then filed a claim petition which was consolidated for hearing and disposition with the employer's petition to terminate benefits. After a series of administrative appeals and remands, the Board affirmed the referee's decision to dismiss the claim petition and to grant the petition to terminate. The claimant then filed the instant appeal.
The claimant argues first*fn1 that the referee capriciously disregarded competent evidence by rejecting the deposition testimony of her treating physician, Dr. Steven Berney, and committed an error of law by sustaining certain objections made by the employer's
[ 78 Pa. Commw. Page 382]
counsel to questions asked of Dr. Berney at the deposition. We are guided here, of course, by the principle that questions relating to the weight of the evidence and to matters of credibility are solely within the province of the referee. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Lombardi), 70 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 392, 453 A.2d 370 (1982).
The referee found that the testimony given by the employer's physician was more credible on the issue whether or not the claimant's injury was work-related and ruled accordingly. And, of course, it is not a capricious disregard of the evidence to reject one physician's opinion and to accept the opinion of another. Killian v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 62 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 29, 434 A.2d 906 (1981). A referee may accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part. Id. The claimant, however, also argues that the referee erred as a matter of law because he sustained objections to many of the questions asked of Dr. Berney and that the referee's strict application of the rules of evidence denied the claimant the right to present her case. It is true that the compensation authorities are not bound to follow the common law or statutory rules of evidence,*fn2 but, this statute has not been interpreted to mean that the rules of evidence can be completely disregarded. See City of Pittsburgh v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 246, 315 A.2d 901 (1974). We note that many of the questions objected to and sustained by the referee, were, for example, leading or based on assumed facts not in evidence, and there was no attempt by the claimant's counsel to elicit the grounds of the employer's objections or to rephrase the questions in a more proper form. Moreover,
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upon reviewing the referee's finding of fact on this issue,*fn3 we believe that it is not at all clear that the referee considered portions of Dr. Berney's deposition to be inadmissible. Instead, he seems to have merely exercised his duty to evaluate the weight of the evidence and to assess credibility and cannot be said to have totally disregarded Dr. Berney's testimony. This is evident, not only in the first sentence of Finding of Fact No. 9, but also in Finding of Fact No. 7 wherein the referee rejected the claimant's testimony in which she denied having any pain relating to her pre-existing arthritic condition. He noted there that ...