the IRS have reason to know of the separation. Therefore, the service of the notice of the Jeopardy Transferee Assessment on Mrs. DeRewal at her home was valid as to Mr. DeRewal as well.
18. When delivering the Notice of Jeopardy Transferee Assessment, Mr. Crawford also personally delivered to Mrs. Jennie DeRewal a Notice of the Statement of Taxes Due.
19. Neither Manfred nor Jennie DeRewal, in their capacity as Trustees, exercised any of the rights of appeal accorded to them under Internal Revenue Code § 7429 (26 U.S.C. § 7429).
19A. On August 12, 1977, the Internal Revenue Service issued and mailed a Notice of Liability to Manfred and Jennie DeRewal as Trustees under Deed of Trust dated December 17, 1975.
20. Manfred and Jennie DeRewal in their capacity as Trustees under the Declaration and Deed of Trust dated December 17, 1975 did not file a Petition with the Tax Court contesting the liability of the Trust as transferee of Manfred and Jennie DeRewal.
21. Manfred and Jennie DeRewal in their capacity as Trustees did not pay the transferee tax liability within ten (10) days after notice and demand.
22. On or about May 24, 1978, a Notice of Levy and Notice of Seizure were served on Jonathan Dunn, Esquire, counsel for the Trustees.
23. Jonathan Dunn tendered to the Internal Revenue Service the Minute Book and Stock Transfer Book of R.E.D., Inc., together with Share Certificates evidencing the issuance of 2,000 shares of the common stock of the corporation to Manfred DeRewal and Jennie DeRewal as Trustees of the Declaration and Deed of Trust dated December 17, 1975.
24. The said 2,000 shares of common stock of R.E.D., Inc. represented all of the assets of the Trust.
25. The said 2,000 shares of common stock of R.E.D., Inc. represented the entire outstanding shares issued by R.E.D., Inc.
26. On July 12, 1978, William B. Crawford, Revenue Officer, executed a Notice of Sealed Bid Sale which described the terms and conditions of the proposed sale of the property.
27. On January 12, 1979, James D. Rideoutte, District Director, Internal Revenue Service, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania executed the Action of Shareholders of R.E.D., Inc. which removed Manfred and Jennie DeRewal from their positions as members of the Board of Directors and elected William Crawford as sole director of R.E.D., Inc.
28. On February 2, 1979, William Crawford executed the actions of Board of Directors of R.E.D., Inc. removing all corporate officers of R.E.D., Inc. and authorizing Crawford to take any action necessary to settle the corporation's controversy in the United States Tax Court, No. 3656-77.
29. On February 2, 1979, William Crawford sent letters advising Manfred and Jennie DeRewal, Deborah DeRewal, Bruce DeRewal, Jennifer Shaak, Manfred DeRewal, Jr., and Pamella Loeffler of their removal as officers of R.E.D., Inc.
30. On February 2, 1979, William Crawford forwarded a letter entitled "Notice to Quit" to Manfred and Jennie DeRewal and demanded that they remove themselves and their belongings from the premises.
31. On March 13, 1979, the United States through its duly authorized agent commenced an Action in Ejectment in state court seeking possession of the 34.672 acres together with improvements thereon.
32. On July 30, 1979, C. Moxley Featherston, Tax Court Judge, entered a Decision against R.E.D., Inc. in Tax Court Docket No. 3656-77 pursuant to a Stipulation, dated July 25, 1979, signed by William Crawford on behalf of R.E.D., Inc.
Removal jurisdiction is derivative; if the state court lacked jurisdiction, the federal court acquires none. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 66 L. Ed. 671, 42 S. Ct. 349 (1922); Gleason v. United States, 458 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1972); Stapleton v. $2,438,110.00, 454 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1972); IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE para. 0.157 (2d Ed. 1983). This is so even though the federal court might have had jurisdiction over the action had it first been brought in the federal system. Id. The Government originally removed the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a state court against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: