No. 2507 PHILADELPHIA, 1980, Appeal from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, of Delaware County, No. 12851-79.
James M. Dolan, Swarthmore, for appellant.
Norman L. Goldberg, Media, for appellee.
Hester, Johnson and Popovich, JJ.
[ 315 Pa. Super. Page 334]
Appellee, Joan Goldberg, filed two Trespass/Assumpsit Complaints with the office of District Justice Martin J. Kerns in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, against appellant, Harry Goldberg, on May 23, 1979. Both complaints were consolidated for purposes of the hearing conducted on June 26, 1979. On June 27, 1979, judgment was entered for
[ 315 Pa. Super. Page 335]
appellee on both cases in the respective amounts of $410.00 and $400.00 plus court costs.
District Justice Kerns mailed notice of both judgments to the parties on July 3, 1979, and appellant's counsel received actual written notice of the judgments on July 6, 1979. On July 30, 1979, appellant filed Notices of Appeal with the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Appellee countered with a Motion to Quash the Appeal on grounds that the Notices of Appeal were untimely filed. By Order of Court, dated October 2, 1980, appellee's Motion to Quash was granted and appellant's appeal to the lower court was quashed. Appellant now appeals from this Order quashing his lower court appeal.
Rule 1002 of the Pa.R.C.P.J.P. sets forth both the time and method of appeal:
A party aggrieved by a judgment may appeal therefrom within thirty (30) days after the date of the judgment by filing with the prothonotary of the court of common pleas a notice of appeal on a form which shall be prescribed by the State Court Administrator. (Emphasis added)
A district justice is bound to enter judgment at the conclusion of proffered evidence on the day of the hearing or within five days thereafter. Pa.R.C.P.J.P. No. 322. He is further obligated to promptly send written notice of judgment to all parties, except to those parties who were issued notice publicly on the day of the hearing. Pa.R.C.P.J.P. No. 324.
Appellant avers that "date of the judgment", as that phrase is used in Rule 1002, supra, necessarily connotes the date notice of judgment is actually received by the appealing party and not the date judgment is made or entered. To hold otherwise, according to appellant, could result in frequent reduction of an appellant's allotted thirty-day appeal period due to the sloth or ...