in this case. Based on the evidence presented at trial, this Court found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Gregg did sell heroin to Moger and Ms. Lewis. Furthermore, Gregg pleaded guilty to making this sale of heroin.
This Court's interpretation of Blockburger as applied to the facts of this case comports with the statutory construction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which has observed, "The cases are clear that one may cause another to commit a crime," 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), or aid and abet the commission of a crime, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) without being a conspirator with the principal offender. United States v. Krogstad, 576 F.2d 22, 29 (3d Cir. 1978), citing United States v. Allard, 458 F.2d 1136, 1139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861, 34 L. Ed. 2d 108, 93 S. Ct. 149 (1972); United States v. Giuliano, 263 F.2d 582, 585 (3d Cir. 1959). Of course, one may both conspire to commit the crime and aid and abet the commission of a crime. See Krogstad, supra, 576 F.2d at 29.
The Blockburger test was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S. Ct. 673, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535, 51 U.S.L.W. 4093 (1983), wherein the Court held that two criminal statutes may be construed to proscribe the same conduct as defined by Blockburger and yet not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, provided that the legislature intended to provide for the possibility of two convictions for two statutory violations arising out of the same conduct. Here, however, this Court need conduct no such searching inquiry as to the intent of Congress in enacting 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 because defendant James' convictions on Counts I and V of this indictment do not punish him twice for the "same conduct." See also Brown v. Ohio, supra; Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 53 L. Ed. 2d 168, 97 S. Ct. 2207 (1977), reh. denied, 434 U.S. 880, 98 S. Ct. 241, 54 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1977). The Court must therefore deny defendant's motion to overturn his convictions on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
An appropriate Order will be accordingly entered.
AND NOW, this 18th day of February, 1983, upon consideration of defendant Ronald James' Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial, for the reasons set forth in this Court's Memorandum of February 18th, 1983,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: The Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial filed by defendant Ronald James are DENIED.
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