decided: December 30, 1982.
FRANK WHITE, JR., APPELLANT,
CONCORD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANY
No. 33 E.D. Appeal Docket, 1982, Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 492 October Term, 1979, dated February 16, 1982, affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, at No. 1538 December Term, 1978, dated February 26, 1979.
Edwin P. Smith and James J. McCabe, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Richard C. Angino, Harrisburg, William V. Coleman, Philadelphia, William H. Pugh, IV, Norristown, Andrew L. Braunfield and Joseph Hankins, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Charles T. Roessing, Philadelphia, for Pa. Def. Institute.
O'Brien, C.j., and Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty and McDermott, JJ. Hutchinson, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Larsen, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Flaherty, J., joins.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
In Davis v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 500 Pa. 84, 454 A.2d 973 (1982), we held that a party injured in an automobile accident may not recover under the uninsured motorist provision of his own insurance policy where the responsible party has maintained liability insurance in at least the minimum amount required by Pennsylvania's financial responsibility law. The question presented in this case is whether recovery should be permitted pursuant to an uninsured motorist clause where the responsible party has
[ 500 Pa. Page 105]
the statutory minimum amount of liability insurance but where the claimant recovers less than that amount because of multiple claims against the responsible party's insurance.
In Davis, we concluded that the plain meaning of the term "uninsured" forecloses the claim that a motorist who has a policy of liability insurance meeting the statutory requirements is "uninsured." Here, although the responsible party was unable to pay the claimant the amount that he would have received had there been two or fewer claimants, the fact remains that, as in Davis, the responsible party had a policy of liability insurance which met statutory requirements. In light of the plain meaning of the term "uninsured," we conclude that the Legislature did not intend that the "uninsured" status of the responsible party should vary according to whether the injured party is able to recover the statutory minimum amount. As we stated in Davis, "[our] Legislature has chosen not to require insurance coverage for those instances in which a tortfeasor's insurance is insufficient to satisfy the injured party's claims . . . . [T]his Court may not enlarge the scope of the plain meaning of the Uninsured Motorist Law to circumvent the Legislature's judgment."
Order of the Superior Court affirmed.
LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Davis v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 500 Pa. 84, 454 A.2d 973 (1982), I dissent.
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