No. 147 Harrisburg, 1980, No. 148 Harrisburg, 1980, Appeal from the Order dated July 1, 1980 of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas at No. 3793 - 1978.
Heath L. Allen, Harrisburg, for Weinstock, appellant (at No. 147) and appellee (at No. 148).
Ronald M. Katzman, Harrisburg, for Gerber et al., appellants (at No. 148) and appellees (at No. 147).
Price, Johnson and Shertz, JJ. Shertz, J., did not participate in the decision or consideration of this case.
[ 308 Pa. Super. Page 12]
On December 27, 1978, an Application for Winding Up Affairs of a Partnership was filed by four attorneys who, at one time, had been engaged principally in the practice of labor law in Harrisburg. The application sought an accounting and the appointment of a receiver in accordance with the Uniform Partnership Act of 1975.*fn1 A fifth attorney, the named defendant, answered with new matter and a counterclaim.
A receiver was appointed to wind up the affairs of the partnership and to submit an advisory opinion to the chancellor relative to the disposition of the counterclaim. On April 9, 1980, the receiver filed his Report with the equity court, which contained certain conclusions of law with respect to the relationship between the parties, determined that no damages were due the defendant on his counterclaim, and found that a sixth attorney, a former partner of one of the plaintiffs and the defendant, inter alios, was a creditor of the partnership subject to dissolution and entitled to payment as such in an amount determined by his contract with the partnership.
[ 308 Pa. Super. Page 13]
So far as the record and the Receiver's Report would reveal, there has been no formal accounting filed with the equity court, nor does the Receiver's Report contain any specificity with respect to the assets and proceeds of the partnership, the monies collected by the receiver, or a schedule of debts and liabilities found to be due by the receiver.
Exceptions to the Receiver's Report were filed by both the plaintiffs and the defendant. On July 1, 1980, the chancellor filed his opinion, upholding the bulk of the receiver's findings and conclusions. The chancellor, however, concluded that the name of the sixth attorney was an asset of the successor partnership, that the value of the asset had not been clearly established, but that the defendant was, in fact, entitled to relief on his counterclaim. The Order of the chancellor, filed the same day, set forth in its entirety:
AND NOW, July 1, 1980, the above captioned case is remanded to the receiver for the purpose of effecting distribution and termination consistent with this opinion.
It is from this order that both sides have brought their respective appeals. Because we find that the order remanding the proceedings to the receiver for the purpose of taking additional testimony is not a final and ...