SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS, HUNTER, WEIS, GARTH, HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER, BECKER, Circuit Judges and RE, Chief Judge.*fn*
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellants in the above entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.
Judges Adams, Gibbons, Higginbotham, Sloviter and Becker would grant rehearing in banc.
BY THE COURT, JOSEPH F. WEIS, JR. Circuit Judge
Statement by Judge Adams sur denial of the petition for rehearing:
Although I do not necessarily disagree with the result in this case, I am troubled that the analysis employed by the panel sweeps too broadly. Changes in patterns of social organization and interaction have drastically altered the nature of places offering meaningful opportunities to speak. I am concerned that an analysis which relies too heavily on whether an area, such as a shopping center or sports complex, has traditionally been regarded as a public forum fails to come to grips with the fact that legal concepts need to evolve to reflect underlying social realities. Furthermore, I believe that courts should be circumspect in deciding that speech is incongruent with the purposes of a particular forum, especially when that forum is employed in such a broad public fashion. I am reluctant to equate inconvenience or minor financial burdens with inconsistency. Nor do I believe that courts should decide without explicit findings, that even where the purposes of a stadium conflict with solicitation by outsiders, that there are not alternative areas within the complex, but outside the stadium itself, that might be appropriate for the distribution of ideas.
In an area as vital to political and personal freedoms as the First Amendment, the judiciary should tailor its statements restricting access as narrowly as possible in order to avoid placing unnecessary limits on speech. "When we deal with the complex of strands in the web of freedoms which make up free speech, the operation and effect of the method by which speech is sought to be restrained must be subjected to close analysis and critical judgment in the light of the particular circumstances to which it is applied." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958) (citations omitted).
Judges Sloviter and Becker join in this ...