while the parties in Kibbe were not schooled in the business world, lacks support. Kibbe turned upon a statutory interpretation of the word "knowledge" and not the degree of sophistication possessed by the parties.
Moreover, plaintiff's speculative assertion that defendant should have known of its security interest, fails to meet the standard which Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 imposes. Specifically, a party resisting a motion for summary judgment must come forward with more than speculation in order to raise a material issue of fact. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 1980). See also, Wire Mesh Products, Inc. v. Wire Belting Ass'n, 520 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Carey v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1981).
Because we conclude that summary judgment is appropriately granted as to Count I of the complaint, we likewise grant the motion as to Count II, which is grounded in conversion. This conclusion is compelled by the fact that defendant cannot be held accountable to plaintiff for a tortious conversion of his own property.
An appropriate order will issue.
AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 1982, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Counts I and II.
AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 1982, in accordance with the Court's Memorandum and Order of this date, IT IS ORDERED that judgment is entered on Counts I and II on behalf of defendant, James F. Wild, Inc. and against plaintiff, Keystone Data Systems, Inc.
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