Appeals from the Orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in cases of John L. Crown v. The Township of Ross, No. SA 1153 of 1980; Robert M. Muchenski v. The Township of Ross, No. SA 1154 of 1980; and Daniel M. Daley v. The Township of Ross, No. SA 1152 of 1980.
Arnold M. Friedman, Friedman and Friedman, for appellants.
William W. Milnes, Brandt, Milnes, Rea and Wagner, for appellee.
President Judge Crumlish and Judges Williams, Jr. and Doyle, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Williams, Jr.
[ 68 Pa. Commw. Page 589]
The factual matrix of these consolidated cases is uncomplicated. By order of August 11, 1980, the Ross Township Civil Service Commission dismissed two of the appellants and suspended one from the township police force. They filed their appeals to the Allegheny
[ 68 Pa. Commw. Page 590]
County Court of Common Pleas on October 10, 1980, the fifty-ninth day after the entry of the order, and considered the appeals timely filed under Section 645 of the First Class Township Code (Township Code).*fn1 Ross Township filed motions to quash the appeals, asserting that 42 Pa. C.S. § 5571(b)*fn2 limited the appeal period to thirty days. The Common Pleas Court granted the motions to quash, determining that the Judicial Code*fn3 does control. That order is presently before us for adjudication.
Appellants argue to this Court that 53 P.S. § 55645 was not either expressly or impliedly repealed by the Judicial Code, and therefore the lower court committed error in quashing their appeals as untimely. It is clear that the Judiciary Act Repealer Act (JARA)*fn4 does not expressly repeal the pertinent provision of the Township Code, although it repeals approximately 1500 specific statutes or portions thereof, including
[ 68 Pa. Commw. Page 591]
over fifty sections of the Township Code. The issue of an implied repealer is not quite so obvious.
Section 1971 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1971, requires that:
(a) Whenever a statute purports to be a revision of all statutes upon a particular subject, or sets up a general or exclusive system covering the entire subject matter of a former statute and is intended as a substitute for such former statute, such statute shall be construed to ...